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Many states impose absolute limits on municipal taxes, such as a one
percent maximum property tax. States also commonly require electoral
approval of municipal taxes. California's Proposition 13 is the best-known
example of such state-imposed requirements. Such restrictions reduce
municipal flexibility in dealing with financial distress and may contribute to
municipalfinancial distress.
This Article argues that Congress may constitutionally preempt such rules
in the exercise of its bankruptcy power. Preemption of state tax limits in
bankruptcy should be found to lie within Congress's power under the
Bankruptcy Clause. The Clause has been interpreted to provide expansive
authority to legislate on the subject of insolvency-that is, a person's general
inability to pay debts. Taxation is intimately bound up with municipal ability to
pay debts. Indeed, taxation occupies a position in municipal debt collection
roughly analogous to that of property in non-municipal debt collection. The
Supreme Court's understanding of the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause has
consistently evolved in the direction of finding broader authority under the
Clause to meet novel conditions, such as the unprecedented potentially
impending municipal debt crisis brought on by a squeeze between pension
obligations that cannot be changed and taxes that cannot be increased
The most serious objection to the Article's thesis may be that preempting
state tax limits would violate the Tenth Amendment. This Article argues that the
requirement that states consent to their municipalities' bankruptcies cures any
Tenth Amendment problem. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the power of state
consent to municipal bankruptcy is such that it authorizes municipalities to
propose bankruptcy plans that would otherwise violate state law, including the
state constitution. The landmark decisions in Detroit and Stockton, which held
that municipal bankruptcy trumped state constitutional protections for
municipal retirees, are recent and prominent cases that embrace this
proposition.
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Just as state constitutional protections for creditors yield to municipal
bankruptcy, so too would state constitutional limits on municipal taxes yield to
a revised municipal bankruptcy statute that preempted them.
Introduction ...................................................392
I. State Tax Limits and a Proposal for Their Preemption in Municipal
Bankruptcy .................................... ..... 396
A. State Tax Limits .................................... 396
B. The Proposal......................................399
II. The Bankruptcy Power .......................... ....... 402
A. The Bankruptcy Power and State Tax Limit Preemption ........... 402
1. Preemption and Bankruptcy Objectives ......... ........ 402
2. The Broad and Expanding Bankruptcy Power .... ..... 406
B. Potential Limits on the Bankruptcy Power... ................. 409
1. Insolvency and Distribution of Property ....... ........ 410
2. Impairment of Noncreditor Rights......... .................. 411
III. The Tenth Amendment ................................ 416
A. The Sufficiency of State Consent.................................416
1. Municipal Bankruptcy Is Upheld as the Court Changes
Its View of the Tenth Amendment ........... ..... 417
2. The Tenth Amendment's Two Revivals: National
League of Cities and the Supreme Court's "New
Federalism" Cases of the 1990s........ ........... 420
B. State Consent and State Constraints. ......... ............ 424
C. Consent to State Tax Limit Preemption .................. 428
D. Arguments That State Consent Is Insufficient ................... 430
1. State Taxation as a Reserved State Domain ............... 431
2. Federalism as an Individual Protection ..... ......... 433
IV. Possible State Circumvention of Tax Limit Preemption .... ..... 435
Conclusion ...................................... ..... 436
Introduction
Municipal bankruptcy has attracted a great deal of attention recently, with
high-profile cases completed in Vallejo' and Stockton,2 California; Jefferson
1. See Bobby White, Bankruptcy Exit Approved for City, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424053111903885604576486402778541450.
2. See Katy Stech, Stockton, Calif, To Exit Bankruptcy Protection on Wednesday,
WALL. ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2015, 4:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/stockton-calif-to-emerge-from-
bankruptcy-protection-on-wednesday-1424815104.
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County, Alabama;3 and Detroit, Michigan.4 A third California case, in San
Bernardino, is continuing.5 As city leaders, residents, and creditors work
through the implications of these cases, the President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York fears the filings may presage more bankruptcies as
municipal governments contend with often-dire financial prospects.6
According to prominent scholars, the central problem that municipal
bankruptcies solves is "excessive" debts, in particular debts owed to employees
such as pensions and retiree health benefits.7 Indeed, the landmark Detroit8 and
Stockton9 decisions made headlines because of their rulings that municipal
bankruptcy can be used to impair pension and retiree health obligations.' 0
This Article seeks to broaden the focus of the discussion beyond
municipal debts to include municipal revenues. After all, financial distress does
not result whenever there are high debts; it results when there are insufficient
3. See Barnett Wright, It's Over. Jefferson County Today Emerges from Bankruptcy
Following Sale of New Sewer Warrants, AL.CoM (Dec. 3, 2013, 10:51 AM),
http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/12/itsover jeffersoncountyemer.html.
4. See Christine Ferretti, Detroit Emerges from Bankruptcy Today, DET. NEWS (Dec.
10, 2014, 11:29 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/ 2 014/12/10/detroit-
bankruptcy/20192957.
5. See Ryan Hagen, "Major Step Forward" for San Bernardino Bankruptcy, SUN
(Apr. 1, 2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.sbsun.com/government-and-politics/20160401/major-step-
forward-for-san-bemardino-bankruptcy ("The end to the city's three-year-old bankruptcy is in
sight. . . .").
6. See William C. Dudley, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y., Opening Remarks for the Chapter 9 and Alternatives for Distressed Municipalities and States
Workshop (Apr. 14, 2015) (arguing that Detroit and Stockton bankruptcies "may foreshadow more
widespread problems" and that "[w]e need to . . . address[] the underlying issues before any problems
grow to the point where bankruptcy becomes the only viable option").
7. See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial
Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1184 (2016) ("Because the financial distress of
many municipalities stems in large part from obligations such as pensions that cannot easily be
restructured outside bankruptcy, additional filings can reasonably be anticipated."); id. at 1224 (arguing
that state insolvency regimes that attempt to remedy distress caused by cities' "profligate pension
arrangements" might be unconstitutional); Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States,
in WHEN STATES Go BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN
THE FISCAL CRISIS 229, 229 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012) ("The principal
advantage of bankruptcy, under current fiscal circumstances, is to allow cities and counties to force
renegotiation of contractual obligations such as pay, retirement, pensions, and health care."); David A.
Skeel, Jr., What Is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 694 ("There
. . . are strong normative grounds for the conclusion that pensions can be restructured, at least in some
circumstances."); David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, Places, or
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2244-45 (2014) (arguing for state bankruptcy regime
providing for restructuring of state pensions); David A. Skeel, Jr., Is Bankruptcy the Answer for
Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1082 (2013) ("There is a strong argument .. . that
the unfunded portion [of municipal pensions] can be restructured in bankruptcy.").
8. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
9. In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
10. See, e.g., Monica Davey et al., Detroit Ruling on Bankruptcy Lifis Pension
Protections, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5. 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/us/detroit-bankruptcy-
ruling.html; Jim Christie & Peter Henderson, Court Lets Stockton, Calif Cut Retiree Health Care,
REUTERS (July 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-bankruptcy-stockton-
idUSL2E81SOA720120728.
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revenues to service those debts. It stands to reason that increasing revenues, not
just cutting obligations, can be part of municipal financial rehabilitation.
This Article focuses on one major obstacle to increasing municipal
revenues. Many states impose absolute limits on municipal taxes, such as a one
percent maximum property tax. States also commonly impose electoral
requirements on municipal taxes, such as a requirement that new sales taxes be
approved by two-thirds of the municipality's residents. California's Proposition
13 is the best-known example of such state-imposed requirements.'1 Many
other states have since adopted similar rules.12
This Article argues that Congress may constitutionally preempt such rules
in the exercise of its power under the Bankruptcy Clause.' 3 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Clause to provide Congress expansive authority to "establish
uniform laws on the subject of any person's general inability to pay his
debts."1 4 Taxation is intimately bound up with municipal ability to pay debts.
Indeed, taxation occupies a position in municipal debt collection roughly
analogous to that of property in non-municipal debt collection.' 5 The Supreme
Court's understanding of the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause has consistently
evolved in the direction of finding broader authority under the Clause to meet
novel conditions. Further, the squeeze between pension obligations that cannot
be changed and taxes that cannot be raised presents a novel set of conditions,
one that threatens to bring a municipal debt crisis.16
The more serious objection to preemption of state tax limits in bankruptcy
might be that preemption would violate state sovereignty, as protected by the
Tenth Amendment. But, crucially, a municipality cannot enter bankruptcy
unless its state authorizes it to do so. Municipal bankruptcy precedents, starting
with the Supreme Court's 1938 decision in United States v. Bekins,17 have
always held that state consent to municipal bankruptcy cures the Tenth
Amendment problem.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the force of state consent to municipal
bankruptcy is such that it empowers the bankrupt municipality to take actions
that would otherwise violate state law, including the state constitution.
Historically, this ability was implicit. For example, the Court in Bekins held
that states could impair contracts in bankruptcy, which necessarily meant that
state constitutional provisions forbidding the impairment of contracts gave
I1. CAL. CONST., art. XIIIA, § 1(a).
12. See discussion infra Section I.A.
13. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
14. Cont'l 111. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 670
(1935) (quoting Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317, 321 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843)).
15. See discussion infra Section II.B. 1.
16. See discussion infra Section II.A.2.
17. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1934).
18. See discussion infra Section III.B.
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way.' 9 The broader proposition-that municipalities can do in bankruptcy what
is otherwise forbidden-has since been made explicit. For example, the
landmark decisions in Detroit and Stockton expressly held that municipal
retirees found no succor in state constitutional provisions forbidding the
impairment of contracts and protecting state pensions. Because of the
supremacy of federal bankruptcy law, retiree health benefits and pensions could
be cut in bankruptcy, notwithstanding the Michigan and California
constitutions.20 This Article argues that the same principle applies to state
constitutional provisions that obstruct municipalities from use of their
otherwise existing taxing power. State consent to a revised municipal
bankruptcy statute that preempted such provisions should be sufficient to cure
federal and state constitutional problems with such a statute.
As noted, the role that revenue increases play in solving municipal
financial distress in bankruptcy court has received comparatively little
attention, even as scholarly interest in municipal bankruptcy has increased.
Recent articles have discussed the claims of residents on bankrupt
municipalities,21 possibilities for aligning municipal bankruptcy more closely
with the goals of bankruptcy law in general, 22 the role of state oversight in
municipal bankruptcy,23 and even the possible use of bankruptcy for reforming
how municipalities are governed.24 But papers discussing the role of taxes in
municipal bankruptcy are relatively rare.
One recent article does argue that Congress intended that tax increases be
considered in municipal bankruptcy and considers potential standards for
judicial implementation of that intent.25 Another discusses fiscal constraints
imposed by states on municipalities as part of the problem of municipal
financial distress and mentions state tax levy limits in passing.26 Still, neither of
these papers explores state tax limits in depth or puts forth a proposal for
19. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54.
20. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149-54, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)
(finding that impairment of Detroit municipal pensions in bankruptcy does not violate federal or
Michigan constitution); In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 14-16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that
impairment of Stockton municipal retiree health benefits in bankruptcy does not violate federal or
California constitution).
21. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118
(2014).
22. See Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L.
REv. 307.
23. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014).
24. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 7.
25. See John Patrick Hunt, Taxes and Ability To Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91
WASH. L. REV. 515 (2016).
26. See Christopher J. Tyson, Exploring the Boundaries of Municipal Bankruptcy, 50
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 668 (2014) (citing "state tax levy limits" as possible cause of local fiscal
distress).
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eliminating them. Apart from a single paragraph in a 2011 article by a
practitioner,27 the subject of this Article appears to be unexplored.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines state-imposed limits on
municipal taxes, including electoral requirements, and presents a proposal to
amend the Bankruptcy Code to preempt such requirements.
Part II analyzes whether state tax limit preemption is within Congress's
power under the Bankruptcy Clause. It argues that preemption serves the
central bankruptcy-law objectives of debtor rehabilitation and creditor
recovery, stressing both that the Supreme Court views the Clause as conferring
expansive powers on Congress and that over time the Court has adopted a
broadening view of Congress's power under the Clause. Part II also addresses a
principal argument that preemption lies beyond Congress's power: that
Congress may not use the Bankruptcy Clause to impair the rights of
noncreditors. This Part argues that Supreme Court precedent and the
Bankruptcy Code both illustrate that Congress may impair and has impaired
noncreditor rights.
Part III analyzes the potential Tenth Amendment objection to state tax
limit preemption. It presents the core argument that state consent to municipal
bankruptcy answers Tenth Amendment objections. Part III also addresses two
potential objections: first, that tax's special relationship to sovereignty makes
state tax limits invulnerable to preemption, and second, that federalism's
function of protecting individual liberty forecloses state tax limit preemption.
Part IV addresses the possibility that states might circumvent preemption
of state tax limits by requiring, as a condition of access to bankruptcy, that
municipalities abide by such limits. Part IV notes that it is not clear that states
have such authority. Even if they do, there is reason to believe they would not
exercise it. Finally, it argues that Congress arguably could condition a state's
access to municipal bankruptcy on its refraining from insisting on tax limits for
its bankrupt municipalities.
I. State Tax Limits and a Proposal for Their Preemption in Municipal
Bankruptcy
A. State Tax Limits
This Article is concerned with two types of state measures that restrict
local taxes: tax limits and electoral requirements. Tax limits restrict local taxes
to particular levels. Electoral requirements mandate popular elections for tax
measures so that such measures cannot be adopted by the ordinary governing
body of a municipality.
27. See Thomas Moers Mayer, State Sovereignty, State Bankruptcy, and a
Reconsideration of Chapter 9, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 363, 383 (2011).
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Perhaps the best-known example of such restrictions is found in
California's Proposition 13, a voter initiative enacted in 1978.28 Proposition 13
and subsequent enactments effectively banned all property tax rate increases,
other than those imposed for infrastructure improvements, by limiting the
property tax rate for general purposes to one percent of the property's assessed
value. 29 The assessed property value itself is prohibited from rising more than
two percent per year, even if the property's appreciation is greater.30
California cities and counties can adopt a variety of taxes other than the
ad valorem property taxes capped by Proposition 13. These include parcel
taxes, sales taxes, hotel taxes, utility taxes, and business taxes.31 However, local
taxes are subject to electoral approval by the voters-governing bodies such as
city councils cannot simply adopt them. Approval requires a majority, fifty-five
percent, or two-thirds of the voters, depending on the taxing entity and the type
of tax. 32
California's 1978 tax revolt started a trend. Eighteen additional states
enacted property tax limits by 1990.33 In 1978, Michigan voters approved the
"Headlee Amendment," which amended the state constitution to limit the
growth in local revenues from assessment increases to the rate of inflation.34 In
Massachusetts, 1980 saw the adoption of "Proposition 2/2," which set both the
maximum property tax rate and the maximum rate of property-tax growth at
2.5%.3 Also in 1980, the New York legislature enacted a six percent limit on
the growth of the assessed value of homes. 36 In Colorado, the 1992 Taxpayer
28. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(a).
29. See id. § 1(a), (b)(2)-(3). Such increases require a two-thirds vote, id. § 1(b)(2),
unless they are for school facilities, in which case they require a fifty-five percent vote, id. § 1(b)(3).
One other exception is that increases are permitted to repay indebtedness approved by voters prior to
July 1, 1978, id. § 1(b)(1). However, this provision can be expected to have little effect on contemporary
municipal bankruptcies.
30. See id. § 2(b).
31. Mac Taylor, A Look at Voter-Approval Requirements for Local Taxes, CAL.
LEGIS. ANALYST'S OFF. 2 (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/finance/local-
taxes/voter-approval-032014.pdf. Other municipalities, such as school districts, community college
districts, and special districts such as fire, water, and flood control districts, can enact fewer types of
taxes. Id.
32. Id. at 5. While general taxes require only a simple majority, "special" taxes require
a two-thirds vote. Special taxes include those levied by special districts, school districts, and community
college districts; taxes dedicated to a specific purpose; and all parcel taxes. Id. Taxes to support school
facilities bond measures can be enacted with a fifty-five percent vote. CAL. CONST. art. XIILA, § 1(b)(3).
33. ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY
TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 112 tbl.5.1 (2008). By contrast, only six states enacted tax
limits in the period before 1978. Id.; see also id. at 181-84 (presenting statistical analysis indicating that
1978 was a "turning point" for state property tax limitation legislation).
34. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 31; see also Headlee Amendment, MICH. IN BRIEF (Apr. 1,
1998), http://www.michiganinbrief.org/edition06/text/issues/issue- 3 I.htm.
35. MARTIN, supra note 33, at 113-15. Massachusetts gubernatorial candidate Edward
J. King was able to beat incumbent Michael Dukakis in the primary election in part because of his
proposal to limit property taxes, which he called the "Massachusetts Thirteen." Id. at 14; see also Div.
Local Servs., Levy Limits: A Primer on Proposition 2 Y,, MASS. DEP'T OF REVENUE 3 (2007),
http://www.mass.gov/dor/docs/dls/publ/misc/levylimits.pdf.
36. MARTIN, supra note 33, at 120.
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Bill of Rights requires electoral approval to increase local taxes and to spend
existing local tax revenues if these revenues grow at a rate higher than the sum
of the rates of inflation and population growth.
Commentators have argued that Proposition 13 made prudent fiscal
management more difficult for California municipalities38 and that the tax
limitations and electoral requirements have contributed to the financial distress
suffered by California municipalities, 39 including the San Jose school district, 40
41 42Orange County, and the City of Vallejo. Similar assertions have been made
respecting other states that followed California's lead and enacted tax-revolt
43measures of their own.
37. State Finances: Constitutional Provisions, COLO. DEP'T TREASURY,
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/treasury/constitutional-provisions-0.
38. See, e.g., STEVEN P. ERIE ET AL., PARADISE PLUNDERED: FISCAL CRISIS AND
GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN SAN DIEGO 68 (2011) ("Although the reduction in property taxes certainly
hurt [San Diego's] finances, the more important aspect of Proposition 13 was its limit on all other forms
of taxes, requiring voter approval for all proposals to increase taxes to pay for specific city services.");
id. at 70 (noting that instead of straightforward revenue measures like trash fees, "in the aftermath of
Proposition 13, Mayor Wilson and the city council expanded the dubious practice of using pension fund
earnings to ease the stress on the city's day-to-day budget"); Michael B. Marois & James Nash,
California Schools Suffer Under Proposition 13 Tax Cap's Chaos, NEWSMAX (July 11, 2011),
http://www.newsmax.com/tUS/BBEXCLUDE-BNALL-BNCOPY-BNSAC/2011/07/12/id/403281
("Before Proposition 13, cities, counties, school districts and other local agencies could set their own tax
rates and collect and spend the proceeds as they saw fit."); see also Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful
Cities?: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 296
n.15 (2016) (collecting sources on the financial distress created by Proposition 13).
39. See, e.g., Alicia Munnell et al., Are City Fiscal Woes Widespread? Are Pensions
the Cause?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. 3 (Dec. 2013), http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/are-city-fiscal-woes-
widespread-are-pensions-the-cause (arguing that "the requirement for a super majority for any revenue
increase made it more difficult for policymakers to raise taxes" and that this difficulty is part of the
explanation for California municipalities' financial distress); Joseph Scott McVicker, The Cahfornia
Budget Crisis, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 353, 355-56 (2010) (observing that Proposition 13 requires a
two-thirds electoral majority for local tax increases and arguing that "Prop. 13 is heavily to blame for the
current fiscal distress of California").
40. See David L. Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme
Court's Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bildisco, 25 B.C. L. REV. 539, 540 n.2 (1984) (reporting that
"many claim" Proposition 13's tax cuts contributed to San Jose school district bankruptcy).
41. See MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY
BANKRUPTCY 13 (1998) (arguing that Proposition 13's tax limits led county officials to pursue risky
investment strategies that eventually failed, precipitating the county's bankruptcy); Omer Kimhi,
Chronicle of a Local Crisis Foretold-Lessons from Israel, 39 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 679, 682 n.12
(2012) ("Although the [Orange County] bankruptcy was the result of bad investments made by the
county's treasurer, California shares much of the responsibility. California shifted costs to its local
governments, but at the same time limited, through Proposition 13, their ability to generate revenues.");
James E. Spiotto, Municipal Finance and Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 17 MUN. FIN. J., Spring 1996, at 1, 3
(arguing that a "revenue-starved" Orange County took excessive investment risks to make up for the
"artificial and unrealistic tax cap and similar constitutional limits on taxation" imposed by Proposition
13 and related legislation).
42. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Government Budgets as the Hunger Games: The
Brutal Competition for State and Local Government Resources Given Municipal Securities Debt,
Pension and OBEP Obligations, and Taxpayer Needs, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 663, 679-80 (2014)
(noting that Vallejo officials attributed the city's financial woes in part to Proposition 13).
43. See Joshua Sapotichne et al., Beyond State Takeovers: Reconsidering the Role of
State Government in Local Fiscal Distress, with Important Lessons for Michigan and Its Embattled
Cities, MICH ST. UNIV. EXTENSION 3 (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://msue.anr.msu.edu/uploads/resources/pdfs/beyond-state-takeovers.pdf ("Michigan's particular
398
Vol. 34, 2017
Constitutionalized Consent
But it is not just that tax limits may have helped cause municipal financial
distress. Tax limits and electoral requirements make it more difficult for cities
to deal with financial distress once it arrives." When a municipality cannot pay
its debts, the solution could include increasing revenue, in addition to reducing
the debt load and/or cutting expenses. State tax limits and electoral
requirements make it difficult for the municipality to raise additional funds and
thus may interfere with successful restructuring. If state tax limits were
removed, municipalities would have more flexibility to address their financial
distress by raising property taxes and other taxes. 45
For the remainder of the Article, limits on municipal taxation and electoral
requirements for municipal taxation will be referred to as "state tax limits."
This Article considers whether Congress may attack the problem of municipal
financial distress by preempting state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy.
B. The Proposal
In brief, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows an insolvent46
municipality to receive bankruptcy protection by filing a petition.47 The petition
stays collection activity against the municipality 48 and gives the municipality an
opportunity to present a plan of adjustment.49 The plan must meet a number of
requirements and upon a determination that the requirements are met, the
bankruptcy court will confirm the plan.5 0 Confirmation of the plan leads, in the
ordinary course, to discharge of the municipality's debts. 5 '
States can choose whether their municipalities can enter municipal
bankruptcy. A municipality cannot enter Chapter 9 bankruptcy unless it is
mix of stringent limitations on local revenue [in combination with other factors] creates conditions that
drive up the potential for local fiscal distress."); Vladimir Kogan, Causes ofFiscal Crises in State and
Local Governments, in EMERGING TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1, 4 (Robert A.
Scott & Stephen M. Kosslyn eds., 2015) (explaining local fiscal crises around the country, in part,
because "[s]ince the 1970s . . . government officials have faced even greater constraints (beyond existing
balanced-budget requirements] in their fiscal authority and flexibility owing to the passage of tax and
expenditure limitations . .. often through mechanisms of direct democracy").
44. See Why Some Calfornia Cities Are Choosing Bankruptcy, MOODY'S INV. SERV.
1 (Aug. 17, 2012) ("Proposition 13, the state's constitutional property tax limitation, restricts the ability
of municipalities to adjust tax rates, thereby capping property tax revenues at a time when flexibility is
most needed.").
45. See Scharff, supra note 38, at 303 ("[V]irtually all municipalities are authorized to
impose property taxes . . . .").
46. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012) (requiring insolvency as a condition of municipal
bankruptcy).
47. Id. § 921.
48. Id. § 901(a) (incorporating § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code into Chapter 9); id.
§ 362 (providing for automatic stay of collection against bankrupt debtors in general); id. § 922
(providing for automatic stay of collection actions particularly relevant to municipal debtors).
49. Id. §941.
50. Id. § 943(b) (listing plan confirmation requirements).
51. Id. § 944(b) (providing for discharge when plan is confirmed, "the debtor deposits
any consideration to be distributed under the plan with a disbursing agent appointed by the court" and
the court determines that the consideration is valid).
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"specifically authorized" to do so by state law or by an authorized state
officer.52 Once a municipality enters bankruptcy, however, the municipality
itself drives the process. For example, the municipality is the only party that
53
may propose a plan of adjustment of debts. However, states may be able to
use the authorization requirement to impose conditions on how the municipality
conducts the bankruptcy.54
Chapter 9 currently seems to require the plan of adjustment to abide by
state tax limits. Section 943(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan
for adjustment of debts in municipal bankruptcy is to be confirmed if "the
debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out
the plan."55 Section 943(b)(6) requires as a condition of confirmation that "any
regulatory or electoral approval necessary under applicable nonbankruptcy law
in order to carry out any provision of the plan has been obtained, or such
provision is expressly conditioned on such approval."56
Thus, under current law, it appears that if a state limits ad valorem
property taxes to 1% of the assessed value of property, then a plan of
adjustment cannot call for an increase to 1.5% of assessed value. Likewise, it
appears that if state law provides that new sales taxes must be approved by a
two-thirds majority of the voters, a plan of adjustment may not call for an
increase in sales taxes without such a vote.
This Article proposes amendments to these two provisions of the Code.57
Section 943, as amended, would read (additions underlined):
§ 943. Confirmation
(b) The court shall confirm the plan if-
(4) the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to
carry out the plan, except that a plan may be confirmed if actions
necessary to carry out the plan include the adoption of tax levels or
increases in excess of limits provided by state law and the debtor is not
otherwise prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out
the plan;
52. Id. § 109(c)(2).
53. Id. § 941.
54. See infra Part IV.
55. Id. § 943(b)(4).
56. Id. § 943(b)(6).
57. This Article is not the first to argue for normatively desirable changes to municipal
bankruptcy law even when those changes may require amending the Code. See Gillette & Skeel, supra
note 7, at 1206 (noting that the authors' proposal to use municipal bankruptcy to effect local governance
reforms has the "potential for impasse" where elections to change local governance are required and
suggesting "express amendment of Chapter 9 to trump city charter amendment provisions" as one way
of dealing with the issue).
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(6) any regulatory or electoral approval necessary under applicable
nonbankruptcy law in order to carry out any provision of the plan has been
obtained, or such provision is expressly conditioned on such approval,
except that a plan may provide for tax increases notwithstanding any
requirement of state law that such increases are subject to electoral
approval ....
The practical effect of these revisions would be that the city council or
other governing body in charge of the municipality58 would be able to levy or
increase taxes that the municipality is otherwise empowered to levy59 without
regard to state law limits on the absolute level of taxes and without holding an
election. For example, the city council of a bankrupt city in California would be
able to propose in its plan of adjustment to raise the ad valorem property tax
rate to 1.5% or the sales tax rate by 1% without holding a local election.60 Only
the debtor may propose a plan of adjustment under Chapter 9,61 so the court
itself would not be imposing tax increases.62
The proposal would not lead to tax increases without limit. Tax increases63
beyond a certain level probably do not produce more revenue, so
municipalities presumably would not pursue such increases, at least
intentionally. The officials who impose the taxes through the bankruptcy plan
58. States have varying ways of dealing with municipal financial distress, and the
ordinary governing body's authority may be displaced under state law in the event of distress. See The
State Role in Local Government Financial Distress, PEW CHARITABLE TR. 14-17 (July 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/04/pew staterole inlocal governmentmfinancial distre
ss.pdf (surveying state approaches to intervention in the affairs of distressed local governments).
Detroit's bankruptcy petition, for example, was filed with the state governor's authorization by an
appointed emergency manager. See Matt Helms et al., Detroit Files for Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Amid
Staggering Debts, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 19, 2013, at Al.
59. Municipalities vary in the types of taxes they are permitted to levy. See Scharff,
supra note 38, at 303 ("While virtually all municipalities are authorized to impose property taxes, fewer
have sales tax authority, and only a fraction of cities have income tax authority.") (citing Cities and
State Fiscal Structure, NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES 16 tbl.1A (2015),
http://www.nlc.org/Documents/Find%20City%2OSolutions/Research%2Olnnovation/Finance/NLCCSF
SReportWEB.PDF).
60. Cities in bankruptcy have on occasion been able to get electoral approval for tax
increases. See Katy Stech, Stockton: Bankruptcy Exit Should Move Ahead, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2014,
12:04 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockton-bankruptcy-exit-should-move-ahead-1417221905
(reporting that Stockton passed a 0.75% sales tax increase during its bankruptcy).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) ("The debtor shall file a plan for the adjustment of the
debtor's debts.").
62. Thus, the set of issues presented when a federal court imposes or orders a tax
increase are not presented by the proposal here. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) ("It is
accepted by all parties, as it was by the courts below, that the imposition of a tax increase by a federal
court [is] an extraordinary event.").
63. This idea is popularly known as the "Laffer Curve." See, e.g., Jude Wanniski,
Taxes, Revenues, and the 'Laffer Curve', 50 PUB. INT. 3 (1978). However, the concept far antedates
Ronald Reagan's advisor Arthur Laffer. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 308-09
(1776). For empirical evidence on the "Laffer Curve" or "revenue hill" for U.S. cities, see Andrew
Haughwout et al., Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities, 86 REV. EcON. & STAT. 570,
582-83 (2004).
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would remain accountable to the voters through elections to office. In the case
of a local city council, this accountability would give councilmembers a reason
not to impose tax increases they are unable to explain. The council would be
freed from supermajority tax approval requirements and from absolute limits on
tax levels.
The tax increases that would be authorized under the proposal are those
"provide[d] for" in the plan or "necessary to carry out the plan." The plan in
question is one "for the adjustment of the debtor's debts." 65 Thus, tax increases
would be authorized under the proposal only if necessary for the plan's
proposed treatment of the municipality's existing debts.
II. The Bankruptcy Power
This Part argues that preemption of state tax limits is within the
bankruptcy power. First, it makes the affirmative case, based on the close
relationship between the taxing power and the key bankruptcy objectives of
debtor rehabilitation and creditor recovery, as well as the broad and expanding
nature of the bankruptcy power. Second, it argues that established and asserted
limits on the bankruptcy power do not rule out state tax limit preemption. Most
significantly, it contends that Congress may impair the rights of noncreditors
such as municipal taxpayers in the exercise of the bankruptcy power.
A. The Bankruptcy Power and State Tax Limit Preemption
Congress has broad power under the Bankruptcy Clause to fashion laws
that serve the core bankruptcy objectives of debtor rehabilitation and creditor
recovery. Preemption of state tax limits serves both objectives by making
additional funds available to the debtor. Therefore, preemption would likely be
found to be within the bankruptcy power. Many municipal bankruptcy plans
call for tax increases, underscoring the fact that such increases facilitate debtor
rehabilitation and creditor recovery.66
1. Preemption and Bankruptcy Objectives
In holding that Detroit could seek to cut its contract obligations in
bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
64. This accountability would be direct if the local city council directs the bankruptcy,
as has happened in California. See, e.g., Joe Mozingo, A Broken City, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2015
(reporting that San Bernardino's city council approved the city's plan of adjustment). The accountability
would be indirect if an appointed emergency financial manager directed the bankruptcy, as happened in
Detroit. See Helms, supra note 58, at Al.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012).
66. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
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observed, "impairing contracts is what the bankruptcy process does."67
Impairing contracts can aid the financial rehabilitation of the debtor, which is
recognized as one of the central concerns of Chapter 9, as well as of the other
reorganization chapters, such as Chapter 11.69
At the same time, state laws prohibiting the impairment of contracts are
not the only ones Congress may preempt using the bankruptcy power. 70 For
example, § 1123(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a Chapter 11
reorganization plan provide for means of its implementation "notwithstanding
any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law."71 In its bankruptcy, California
utility Pacific Gas & Electric argued that this provision entitled it to sell or
transfer assets under a reorganization plan without approval of the California
Public Utilities Commission, even though state law required such approval.72
The Ninth Circuit held that § 1123(a)(5) expressly preempted conflicting state
law.73 Although the court found, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the
scope of the preemption was limited to matters relating to the debtor's financial
condition because of another provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 74 there was no
suggestion that preemption was limited to state law impairing contract
obligations.
67. See In re City of Detroit, 504 BR. 97, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); see also id.
("The Bankruptcy Clause necessarily authorizes Congress to make laws that would impair contracts. It
long has been understood that bankruptcy law entails impairment of contracts." (quoting In re City of
Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012))).
68. See In re City of Desert Hot Springs, 339 F.3d 782, 789 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[Chapter
9] provides a debtor with an array of bankruptcy powers to enable it to achieve financial rehabilitation."
(quoting In re Richmond Sch. Dist., 133 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991))); In re Hardeman Cty.
Hosp. Dist., 540 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2015) ("Confirmation of the Plan will be the final step
in the rehabilitation . . . of the Hospital," a Chapter 9 debtor); In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 59
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015) ("[Chapter 9's] policy of successful rehabilitation of debtors.").
69. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85 (1991) ("debtor rehabilitation
chapters"); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) ("[T]he policy of Chapter II is to
permit successful rehabilitation of debtors . . . ."); Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678, 687 (1966)
(observing that "the goal" of Chapter XI is "the ultimate rehabilitation of the debtor"); SEC v. Am.
Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 607 (1965) (holding that Chapters X and XI are "two distinct methods
of corporate rehabilitations"); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940) (purpose of
bankruptcy act for farmers was to "effectuate a broad program of rehabilitation of distressed farmers");
Case v. L.A. Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 125 (1939) (stating that in bankruptcy the debtor
"invokes the aid of the federal courts in reorganization or rehabilitation").
70. Cf Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938) ("Bankruptcy
proceedings constantly modify and affect the property rights established by state law. A familiar
instance is the invalidation of transfers working a preference, though valid under state law when
made.").
71. 11 U.S.C. § I l23(a)(5) (2012).
72. PG&E v. California, 350 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 2003).
73. Id. at 946 ("The issue is ... not whether there is express preemption under
§ 1123(a), but rather its extent.").
74. Id. at 949 ("We hold that the scope of preemption under the 'notwithstanding'
clause of § 1123(a) is the same as under the 'notwithstanding' clause of § 1142(a), and that otherwise
applicable nonbankruptcy laws 'relating to financial condition' are expressly preempted under both
§§ 1123(a) and 1142(a)."). The court remanded for further consideration of whether the state
requirement of Commission approval to transfer assets was preempted under the standard it set forth. Id.
It does not appear that the lower courts ever ruled on the preemption issue.
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The Chrysler bankruptcy provides another example of preemption of state
laws other than those prohibiting impairment of contracts. In that case, state
dealer laws restricted the termination of Chrysler dealers by providing
"statutory notice and waiting periods for wind-downs and buy-back
requirements for terminations with or without cause." 75 The Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York found that § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code, establishing the debtor's right to reject contracts, preempted the state
dealer laws. 6
The PG&E and Chrysler cases indicate that Congress may preempt state
law generally-not just state prohibitions on contract impairment-in the
service of bankruptcy objectives. Preempting state tax limits can assist the
municipality in righting its finances, because a municipality with more
flexibility to raise revenue can more easily be rehabilitated. But freeing the
municipality from state tax limits also serves another critical bankruptcy
objective, one that has not received as much attention in recent municipal
bankruptcy opinions: creditor recovery. This Section argues that realizing
recoveries for creditors, like rehabilitating debtors, is "what the bankruptcy
process does." 77
Bankruptcy historically has been understood as primarily a device for
creditor recovery. Under English bankruptcy laws in effect at the time of the
Revolution, "[r]elief was not for debtors, but from debtors."7 James Madison
defended the Bankruptcy Clause in the Federalist on the ground that it would
help creditors. 79 Accordingly, "[t]he idea of a bankruptcy law as a means of
providing a fresh start for distressed debtors was foreign to the framers."8 0 The
very first bankruptcy statute enacted in the United States was "purely a
creditor's remedy,"8 1 and voluntary bankruptcy did not even exist in the United
75. In re Old Carco LLC (f/k/a Chrysler LLC), 406 B.R. 180, 199 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009).
76. See id. at 199-207 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing field and conflict
preemption and finding state dealer laws preempted). See generally Jeffrey B. Ellman & Brett J. Berlin,
Bankruptcy Code Preemption ofState Law, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3 (2012) (discussing preemption of
state law in recent bankruptcy cases).
77. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
78. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 8 (1995); see also id. (noting that the "overriding purpose" of English
bankruptcy law was "to aid creditors in the collection of debts"); Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v.
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935) ("The English law of bankruptcy, as it
existed at the time of adoption of the Constitution, was conceived wholly in the interest of the creditor
and proceeded upon the assumption that the debtor was necessarily to be dealt with as an offender.").
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison) (arguing that a uniform bankruptcy law
would "prevent . .. many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different
states").
80. Tabb, supra note 78, at 43. Instead, "[t]he model [the Framers] had in mind was
the one in existence in England, where bankruptcy was a collective collection remedy that creditors
could invoke involuntarily against a merchant trader who had committed an act of bankruptcy." Id. at
43-44 (internal quotations omitted).
81. Id. at 14; see also Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 373 (2006) (noting
that the act of 1800 was "like the English law, chiefly a measure to benefit creditors").
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States until 1841.82 Throughout the nineteenth century, bankruptcy statutes
were typically sought by creditors, not debtors.83 The first permanent
bankruptcy statute, enacted in 1898, was no exception. 84 Indeed, southern
congressmen representing debtor interests tried to have the 1898 Act repealed
in 1902, 1903, 1909, and 1910.85
The increasing solicitude for debtors after 1898 reflects the addition of a
second policy, not the replacement of the original pro-creditor policy. The
Supreme Court continues to recognize the centrality of creditor relief in
bankruptcy. It has stated repeatedly-most recently in Katz in 2006-that the
bankruptcy power includes the "subject of the relations between an insolvent or
nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and his creditors, extending to his and their
relief."86 Lower courts also continue to recognize the centrality of creditor
recovery to bankruptcy policy.87
Scholars, too, find that a central purpose of bankruptcy law is the
protection of creditors.88 Indeed, it has been argued, albeit in reference to pre-
Code law, that creditor protection is a more fundamental feature of bankruptcy
than debtor rehabilitation. 89 Perhaps the most famous scholarly exposition of
the idea that bankruptcy operates for creditors and not just for debtors is the
"creditors' bargain" theory of corporate bankruptcy, which describes
82. Tabb, supra note 78, at 17.
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id. at 24 (observing that the 1898 Act had its "origins with the credit industry").
Although the 1898 Act is credited with "usher[ing] in the modem era of liberal debtor treatment in
United States bankruptcy laws," nevertheless, "[m]uch of the 1898 Act was directed not a debtor relief,
but rather at facilitating the equitable and efficient administration and distribution of the debtor's
property to creditors." Id. at 24-25.
85. Id. at 27.
86. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 371 (2006) (emphasis added)
(quoting Wright v. Cent. Union Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938)); Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 466 U.S. 457, 466 (1982); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47 (1938); Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 n.18 (1935); Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi.,
Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 673 (1935). The phrase appears to have originated in In re
Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490 (No. 11,673) (S.D.N.Y. 1874), cited with approval in Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 187 (1902).
87. In re River W. Plaza-Chicago, LLC, 664 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 2011) ("A central
purpose of bankruptcy . .. is to maximize creditor recovery." (quoting Corp. Assets, Inc. v. Paloian, 368
F.3d 761, 767 (7th Cir. 2004))); In re Daufuskie Island Props., 431 B.R. 626, 640 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010)
("[T]he ultimate goal of any bankruptcy proceeding is to create and maximize value and benefits for
creditors of the estate and other parties involved in the case to share.").
88. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy
Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 391 (2014)
("[T]he purpose of the federal bankruptcy law is not wholly confined to providing a fresh start for
debtors; rather, bankruptcy policy seeks to accommodate the interests of creditors as well as debtors.").
89. Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History ofBankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV.
223, 225 (1918) ("All bankruptcy law ... no matter when or where devised and enacted, has at least two
general objects in view . . . . [It] seeks to protect the creditors, first, from one another and, secondly,
from their debtor. A third object, the protection of the honest debtor from his creditors, by means of the
discharge, is sought to be attained in some of the systems of bankruptcy, but this is by no means a
fundamental feature of the law.").
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bankruptcy as a procedural mechanism for the efficient collection of debts.90
This Article does not go as far as some commentators and argue that the
creditors' bargain is the right framework for municipal bankruptcy.91 Certainly,
municipal rehabilitation is a central feature. Nevertheless, the prominence of
the creditors' bargain theory shows how close creditor recovery lies to
bankruptcy's core. Further, bankruptcy law's emphasis on creditor recovery is
not limited to private bankruptcy. A deep concern with creditor recovery
pervades the legislative history of the municipal bankruptcy statutes. 92
Creditor recovery thus holds a central place in bankruptcy policy, even
though recovery received comparatively little attention in the landmark
Stockton and Detroit decisions. But it is important to remember that state tax
limit preemption is unusual because it serves two objectives: not just creditor
recovery but also debtor rehabilitation. Although the bankruptcy objective of
creditor recovery is often in tension with the bankruptcy objective of debtor
rehabilitation, that is not the case when the issue is preemption of state tax
limits.
2. The Broad and Expanding Bankruptcy Power
There is ample support for the general proposition that bankruptcy law
looks out for creditors as well as debtors. That proposition does not in itself tell
us just how Congress can go about pursuing the objectives of creditor recovery
and debtor rehabilitation. Nothing speaks directly to Congress's power-or
lack thereof-to preempt state tax limits. Congress has never tried to do so, and
non-municipal debtors lack taxing power. However, the Court's general
statements on the reach of the bankruptcy power indicate both that it is broad
and that it has expanded over time to meet new conditions. These statements
suggest that the bankruptcy power encompasses preemption of state tax limits
to meet the relatively new condition of a municipal debt crisis brought on in
part by tax revolt.
The Supreme Court has rarely attempted to capture the extent of the
bankruptcy power in a discrete formulation. Indeed, the Court has stated that
"[t]he subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition." 93 However, on at
90. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 857 (1982) ("[The] discharge-centered view of bankruptcy is
correct neither from an historical nor from a realistic appraisal of the presence and operation of most of
the provisions in the federal bankruptcy laws over the years.").
91. See Jonah Peppiatt, The Waterfall of Tiers: A Relocation Cost-Based Theory of
Municipal Insolvency and a Proposal for a New Municipal Bankruptcy Regime, 32 EMORY BANKR.
DEv. J. 335, 350-54 (2016) (arguing for adapting the creditors' bargain theory of bankruptcy for use in
municipal cases).
92. See Hunt, supra note 25, at 530-44.
93. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1938); see also Cont'l
Ill. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 669-70 (finding that the
limitations on the Bankruptcy Clause "have never been explicitly defined, and any attempt to do so now
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least one occasion, the Court has suggested a phrase to sum up the power, and
on that occasion, its formulation was expansive. In Continental Illinois Bank &
Trust Co. of Chicago v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 94 the
Court approvingly quoted Kunzler v. Kohaus.95 In Kunzler, the Court for
Correction of Errors of New York upheld Congress's nineteenth-century
extension of bankruptcy to persons other than traders and found that Congress
was authorized "to establish uniform laws on the subject of any person's
general inability to pay his debts." 96 Given the connection between financial
inflexibility and insolvency, preemption of state tax limits in municipal
bankruptcy would seem to fall within the "subject of the [municipality's]
general inability to pay [its] debts."
More common than attempts to encapsulate the bankruptcy power are
affirmations of Congress's broad authority in exercising that power. Early on,
in Sturges v. Crowninshield,97 the Supreme Court held that "the Legislature
may exercise an extensive discretion" regarding the scope of the bankruptcy
power.98 More recently, the Court, affirming the constitutionality of the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act, referred to the "broad scope of
congressional power under the Bankruptcy Clause." 99 Moreover, the Court has
found that the Necessary and Proper Clause further extends Congress's power
under the Bankruptcy Clause, although the Court has not specified the scope of
the extension.' 00
would result in little more than a paraphrase of the language of the Constitution without advancing far
toward its full meaning").
94. 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
95. 5 Hill 317 (N.Y. 1843).
96. Cont'1 Ill., 294 U.S. at 667 (quoting Kunzler, 5 Hill at 321); see also Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 188 U.S. 181, 187 (1902) (approvingly citing Kunzler); Ashton v. Cameron Cty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. 1. 298 U.S. 513, 537 (1938) (approvingly quoting same language from
Kunzler). The dissent in Ashton suggested that the 1934 Act was within the bankruptcy power, id. at
534-37 (Cardozo, J., dissenting), and the majority did not disagree with that suggestion. See id at 527
("[W]e assume for this discussion that the enactment is adequately related to the general 'subject of
bankruptcies."').
97. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
98. Id. at 195 (rejecting a strict division between insolvency and bankruptcy laws on
the ground of Congress's discretion to define the scope of bankruptcy law). More broadly, Sturges
"rejected a challenge to the state act based on the argument that the federal power in bankruptcy was
exclusive but warned in dictum that a federal statute would preempt conflicting state legislation." Peter
J. Coleman, Sturges v. Crowninshield, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS 297, 297 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1999).
99. Reg'1 Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 154 (1974) (holding Congress
was authorized under the Bankruptcy Clause to compel conveyance of railroad properties to Conrail,
where conveying railroads could seek compensation under the Tucker Act if Conrail was not able to pay
the constitutional minimum for the properties).
100. See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513 (1938) ("To this
specific grant [of bankruptcy power], there must be added the powers of the general grant of clause
eighteen."); see also id. ("The subject of bankruptcies is incapable of final definition. The concept
changes."); see also id. at 514-15 (holding that Bankruptcy Code can extend period for exercise of
equity of redemption that would otherwise exist under state law). Scholars have likewise described
bankruptcy law in expansive terms. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values. A
Jurisprudence ofBankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 762 (1991) ("Bankruptcy law is a response to the
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The Court recognizes, of course, that the Bankruptcy Power has limits,10 '
but it has, by and large, declined to state what they are. In only one case-
inapplicable to the subject at hand-has the Court found a statute to lie outside
Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause. In Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. Gibbons,102 the Court held that a bankruptcy statute must not be too
similar to a private bill. It found that a bankruptcy statute that protected the
employees (and presumably harmed the creditors) of a single named railroad
was not a "uniform" bankruptcy law and therefore lay outside the Bankruptcy
Power.1o3 Preemption of state tax limits is a law of general applicability: it
would apply in all states that authorize municipal bankruptcy and impose state
limits on municipal taxes. Thus, it presents no issue with uniformity in the
sense recognized in Gibbons.
Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause has been understood not
just as broad, but also as expanding to meet changing needs. The Supreme
Court has consistently approved expansions of bankruptcy law under the
Bankruptcy Clause. As Professor Jonathan Lipson recently observed, "In the
vast majority of cases since [the framing era], our approach has been to side
with the bankruptcy power, and against any constitutional rule, standard, norm,
or value that may constrict it." 10
The Supreme Court itself foreshadowed Lipson's observation. In the
Continental Illinois case, the Court summarized the history of the bankruptcy
power: "From the beginning, the tendency of legislation and of judicial
interpretation has been uniformly in the direction of progressive liberalization
in respect of the operation of the bankruptcy power."'05 The Court reviewed
American bankruptcy law's origins in English law,106 early statements that the
subjects of Congress's powers were not to be understood as limited to their
English antecedents,1 07 the steady expansion of the persons who could be in
bankruptcy from traders to "practically all classes of persons and
corporations,"', 0 8 the evolution of the law from one concerned wholly with
problem of financial distress-not only as an economic, but as a moral, political, personal, and social
problem that affects its participants.").
101. See Cont'llll., 294 U.S. at 669.
102. 455 U.S. 457 (1982).
103. Gibbons, 455 U.S. at 470-71 ("[The challenged act] is nothing more than a
private bill . . . . A law can hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country if it applies only to one
debtor and can be enforced only by the one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over that debtor."); see
also Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Toward a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 605, 685 (2008) ("Bankruptcy relief-or at least the discharge-must have some
meaningfully public interest to come within the bankruptcy power. Otherwise, it is ultra vires.").
104. Lipson, supra note 103, at 609. See generally KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY
AND THE SUPREME COURT 123-33 (2008) (discussing Supreme Court's bankruptcy power
jurisprudence).
105. Cont'l Ill., 294 U.S. at 668.
106. Id. at 668.
107. Id. at 668-69.
108. Id. at 670.
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aiding creditors to one protecting the "honest but unfortunate" debtor,109 and
the introduction in 1867 of the debtor's ability to propose a composition of
debts." 0 It concluded:
The fundamentally and radically progressive nature of these extensions
becomes apparent upon their mere statement; but all have been judicially
approved or accepted as falling within the power conferred by the
bankruptcy clause of the Constitution. Taken altogether, they demonstrate
in a very striking way the capacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet new
conditions as they have been disclosed as a result of the tremendous
growth of business and development of human activities from 1800 to the
present day. And these acts, far-reaching though they be, have not gone
beyond the limit of congressional power; but rather have constituted
extensions into a field whose boundaries may not yet be fully revealed.II
The expansion of the Court's understanding of the bankruptcy power
apparently has continued even through the Rehnquist era of increased solicitude
for states' interests.1 12
Preemption of state tax limits can be seen as an example of use of the
bankruptcy power to "meet new conditions." It does not appear that
municipalities have ever faced anything quite like the combination of pension
costs and tax limits that could lead to widespread financial distress.113
Preemption addresses this novel problem in a manner that is consistent with the
Court's understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause as a dynamic and flexible
device.
B. Potential Limits on the Bankruptcy Power
Despite the breadth and flexibility of the bankruptcy power, it does have
limits. This section discusses principles that do or might limit the bankruptcy
power. First, it addresses the proposition that the bankruptcy power is limited to
adjusting the affairs of insolvent debtors, which does not interfere with state tax
preemption in municipal bankruptcy because municipal debtors must be
109. Id at 670-71.
110. Id at 671.
111. Id.
112. Lipson, supra note 103, at 637-38 ("In the case of vertical [federal-state]
relations, bankruptcy appears to be an exception to the Rehnquist Court's robust protection for states
from federal judicial power."); see also id. at 675 (further discussing bankruptcy exceptionalism).
113. State tax limits are a phenomenon of the past forty or so years. See supra Section
I.A. Cities currently face high unfunded pension and health care costs. See, e.g., Cities Squeezed by
Pension and Retiree Health Shortfalls, PEW CHARITABLE TR. I (Mar. 8, 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/0001/01/01/cities-squeezed-by-pension-and-
retiree-health-care-shortfalls ("Thirty cities at the center of the nation's most populous metropolitan
areas faced more than $192 billion in unpaid commitments for pensions and other retiree benefits,
primarily health care, as of fiscal 2009."). The author's research has not turned up any indication that
such a combination has existed in previous eras of American history.
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insolvent. Next, it addresses the language of some cases suggesting that
bankruptcy must involve the distribution of estate property. This language
cannot apply to municipal bankruptcy because tax revenue, not property, is
what backs municipal debt. Finally, it addresses the most significant challenge:
the contention that Congress cannot impair the rights of noncreditors using the
bankruptcy power. Supreme Court precedent and existing Bankruptcy Code
provisions are inconsistent with this contention. Moreover, the contention's
major academic defender, Professor Thomas Plank, relies on a way of defining
the bankruptcy power that the Supreme Court has rejected.
1. Insolvency and Distribution of Property
Some potential limits on the bankruptcy power do not apply to state tax
limit preemption in municipal bankruptcy. For example, it has been argued that
debtor insolvency is a constitutional prerequisite to bankruptcy. 114 The
Bankruptcy Code already imposes insolvency as a requirement for municipal
bankruptcy, and this Article does not propose changing that requirement.' 15
Any constitutional insolvency requirement would not bar preemption of state
tax limits.
Similarly, courts have sometimes stressed the distribution of property in
discussing the bankruptcy power.116 These descriptions look toward liquidation
of the debtor's assets as the basic operation of bankruptcy. Liquidation of
municipal property to satisfy debts generally is not possible, either inside1 or
outside bankruptcy." 8 Accordingly, descriptions of the bankruptcy power in
114. See KLEE, supra note 104, at 130-31; Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and
Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063, 1093-95 (2002) [hereinafter Plank, Bankruptcy and
Federalism]; Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits ofBankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487, 546-56
(1996) [hereinafter Plank, Constitutional Limits ofBankruptcy].
115. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2012) ("An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this
title if and only if such entity ... is insolvent .... ).
116. See, e.g., In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716, 718 (C.C.D. Mo. 1843) (No. 7865) ("[The
bankruptcy power] extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property of the debtor
among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its greatest is a discharge of the debtor from his contracts. And
all intermediate legislation, affecting substance and form, but tending to further the great end of the
subject-distribution and discharge-are in the competency and discretion of congress."). This language
from Klein has appeared in subsequent Supreme Court opinions. See Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n v.
Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 466 (1982); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588
n. 18 (1935); Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 186 (1902).
117. The House Judiciary Committee report on H.R. 8200, the predecessor to the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, stated that liquidation of the debtor "is not possible in a municipal case." H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 400 (1977). In municipal bankruptcy, the court is forbidden from interfering with
the municipality's property or revenue. See 11 U.S.C. § 904(2) (2012) ("[U]nless the debtor consents or
the plan so provides, the court may not . . . interfere with . . . any of the property or revenues of the
debtor."). Reflecting the restrictions on interfering with municipal property, municipal bankruptcy does
not feature creation of a bankruptcy estate. See § 541 (providing for creation of bankruptcy estate); id.
§ 901(a) (not incorporating § 541 by reference into chapter 9).
118. See ROBERT M. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT
FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 340 (2d ed. 2013) ("The general rule is that execution will not
be awarded to enforce a judgment against a municipal corporation absent a statute to the contrary.");
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE. J. ON
410
Vol. 34, 2017
Constitutionalized Consent
terms of liquidation are incomplete. The Court has recognized this proposition
not just in the context of municipal bankruptcy," 9 but also earlier in its
approval of compositions without liquidation in the nineteenth century'20 and in
the approval of railroad reorganization provisions that did not require
liquidation.121
Instead of liquidation of property, collection of debts from municipalities
focuses on tax increases. The taxing power of the state is the main source of
recovery for municipal creditors, and municipal debts are traditionally collected
through a writ of mandamus requiring that taxes be increased to cover the
debts.122 Congress intended that municipalities raise taxes, within limits, in
bankruptcy,123 and municipal bankruptcy reorganization plans commonly call
for tax increases.124 Bankruptcy facilitates the gathering and distribution of
property when the debtor's property is the main source of funds for debt
recovery, so it is reasonable to suppose that bankruptcy can facilitate taxes
where the debtor's taxing power is the main source of funds for debt recovery.
The debtor's taxing power in municipal bankruptcy is a rough analog of the
debtor's property in nonmunicipal bankruptcy.
2. Impairment of Noncreditor Rights
Perhaps the most powerful objection to lifting state tax limits in municipal
bankruptcy is that doing so would trample the rights of third parties-either
REG. 351, 371 (2010) ("Even if the locality is in default, the creditors are unable to take municipal
property as payment for their loans, and the locality retains complete control of all its public assets.").
119. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47 (1938) (holding municipal
bankruptcy statute within bankruptcy power and citing In re Reiman and Continental Illinois).
120. See In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11.673) (holding
that the composition statute "relate[s] to the subject of bankruptcies" (internal quotation marks
omitted)). The opinion of future Supreme Court Justice Blatchford in Reiman was cited with approval in
Hanover National Bank, 486 U.S. at 187, and was later effectively adopted by the Supreme Court.
Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 672 (1935).
121. See Cont ' 111, 294 U.S. at 671-72 (finding that railroad reorganization, not
necessarily involving liquidation, "cannot be distinguished in principle from the composition with
creditors authorized by the act of 1867, as amended by the act of 1874"); id. at 675 (stating that railroad
reorganization statute "is within the power conferred by the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution").
122. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 445 (1993) ("[T]he principal
remedy, in practice, was one that has no analogy in private law: the issuance of a writ of mandamus
requiring imposition of new taxes.").
123. See generally Hunt, supra note 25 (discussing legislative history of municipal
bankruptcy statutes and Congress's intention that taxes be raised in bankruptcy up to the limit of the
city's ability to pay). The importance of taxes to municipal debt collection does not in itself mean that
Congress may abrogate state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy, because a writ of mandamus for debt
collection generally may order only taxes authorized by state law. McConnell & Picker, supra note 122,
at 447-48. Nevertheless, the relative importance of taxes and relative unimportance of property sales in
municipal debt collection indicate that facilitating municipal taxes is related to the subject of
bankruptcies.
124. See Hunt, supra note 25, at 558-59 (reporting that Stockton and San Bernardino,
California and Central Falls, Rhode Island proposed plans calling for tax increases, while Jefferson
County, Alabama's plan called for increased sewer rates).
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taxpayers who would be protected by procedural or substantive limits on
raising state taxes or residents whose state-law right to vote on municipal taxes
might be taken away. It is questionable whether state-law tax limit provisions
create individual "rights" in residents or taxpayers.125 It is also questionable
whether municipal residents-who would presumably include most if not all
municipal taxpayers-are "noncreditors."1 26 However, assuming that state tax
preemption does impair noncreditor rights, then an objection could be leveled
that the impairment is beyond Congress's bankruptcy power.
Although the rights impaired in bankruptcy usually belong to creditors,
Supreme Court precedent and existing Bankruptcy Code provisions indicate
that Congress may exercise the bankruptcy power to impair the rights of
noncreditor parties. At the same time, the most sustained defense of the
contrary position, found in two articles by Professor Thomas Plank,127 rests on
an argument that the Court has rejected.
The Supreme Court confirmed that bankruptcy may interfere with the
rights of a noncreditor in Wright v. Central Union Fire Insurance Co. 12 In
Wright, an insurance company bought land formerly belonging to Wright at a
foreclosure sale while Wright's bankruptcy was pending.129 The bankruptcy
statute extended the redemption period-the period during which Wright could
reclaim the land by paying the creditor-beyond what state law provided. 130
The insurance company sought a decision that Wright was limited to the shorter
state redemption period. It argued that the bankruptcy statute's purported
extension of the redemption period was unconstitutional, contending that
"under the Bankruptcy Clause Congress is confined to legislation for the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor relationship,"1 32 and that the purchaser at a
foreclosure sale is not a creditor.
The Court assumed that the insurance company was not a creditor when it
bought at the foreclosure salel33 and rejected the insurer's argument. The Court
125. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 28, 33 (1994) ("Tax legislation is not
a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal Revenue Code.").
126. See Anderson, supra note 21, at 1123 (arguing that municipal residents are in
effect creditors of the bankrupt municipality, in the sense that "everyone (liberal, conservative, and
libertarian alike) assumes that residents have some claim to share in [a] city's present and future
revenues").
127. See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 114; Plank, Constitutional
Limits ofBankruptcy, supra note 114.
128. 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
129. Id. at 509.
130. Id. at 513.
131. Id. at 505-06.
132. Id. at 514.
133. Id ("While there may be no relation of debtor and creditor between the bankrupt
and the purchaser of his property at judicial sale, we think the purchaser at a judicial sale does enter into
the radius of the bankruptcy power over debts."). In this case, the insurance company was purchasing at
the foreclosure sale on its own mortgage, id. at 505, 509, so its argument that it was not a creditor could
have been questioned. The Court, however, did not take this tack in deciding the case-it seemed to
assume for the sake of argument that the insurance company was not a creditor. Id. at 514-15. Professor
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found that "until the right of redemption expires the rights of the purchaser are
subject to the power of the Congress over the relationship of debtor and
creditor and its power to legislate for the rehabilitation of the debtor.", 34 The
Court thus held that the bankruptcy power does not extend just to the
relationship of debtor and creditor but also to the rehabilitation of the debtor. If,
as argued, preemption of state tax limits is a reasonable way of legislating "for
the rehabilitation of the debtor," then Wright supports the constitutionality of
preemption.
Existing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code also call for impairment of
noncreditor rights. For example, an innocent person who has received a gift
from an insolvent debtor-or who has bought property from an insolvent
debtor for less than "reasonably equivalent value"- may be called on to return
what she or he has received under the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent-transfer
provision. 135 Even if state law permits the recipient to keep the gift,136 the
Bankruptcy Code takes it away in order to make property available for
distribution and/or reorganization.' 37
The fraudulent transfer provision, which is recognized as a fundamental
part of bankruptcy law, does not seem to have been challenged on
constitutional grounds. Another provision has been more controversial. A co-
owner of property with the debtor may lose her or his property rights in
bankruptcy. Section 363(h) of the Code authorizes the trustee to sell both the
Thomas Plank argues that the Court in effect found that the purchaser became a creditor when it bought
at the foreclosure sale subject to the right of redemption. Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy,
supra note 114, at 543-44. However, the Court's use of "and" in referring to the "power of Congress
over the relationship of debtor and creditor and its power to legislate for the rehabilitation of the debtor,"
Wright, 304 U.S. at 514, suggests that the bankruptcy power extends beyond adjustment of debtor-
creditor relations.
134. Wright, 304 U.S. at 514.
135. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012). If the recipient of the fraudulent transfer gave
value and acted in good faith, the recipient may keep what has been transferred to the extent of the value
given. See id. § 548(c); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1548.06[4] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed. 2015).
136. Every state has a fraudulent transfer law. See John E. Sullivan III, Future
Creditors and Fraudulent Transfers, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 955, 960 n.7 (1997). In most states these laws
track the Bankruptcy Code. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 135, at ¶ 548.01[2][a](i]
("Most states have adopted the 1984 UFTA [Uniform Fraudulent Transactions Act] . For the most
part, the UFTA tracks section 548."). However, there are instances where a transfer would be
impervious to attack under the state's fraudulent-transfer law but subject to avoidance under bankruptcy
law. See id. (noting that UFTA "has expanded defenses" relative to § 548); compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1) (2012) (two-year statute of limitations), with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2041 (2016)
(providing for statute of limitations of one year after obligee learns or should have learned of the
avoidable transfer).
137. The Supreme Court has in one case stated that fraudulent conveyance claims are
"quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state-law contract claims brought by a
bankrupt corporation to augment the bankruptcy estate than they do creditors' hierarchically ordered
claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res." Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989).
The issue in Granfinanciera was the transferees' right to a jury trial, not the extent of Congress's powers
under the Bankruptcy Clause, and the Court did not address the ways in which § 548's substantive
provisions differ from state fraudulent-transfer law. Courts continue to recognize that "Granfinanciera
involved a federal-law claim . . . ." Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins.), 702
F.3d 553, 564 (9th Cir. 2012), aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
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estate's interest and the co-owner's interest, provided certain conditions are
met.138 One bankruptcy court stated, as one of two independent grounds for its
ultimate decision, 139 that this provision exceeded Congress's power under the
Bankruptcy Clause. 140 However, this decision does not appear to have been
followed in any case. At least one court has rejected the same constitutional
challenge,141 and sales under § 363(h) apparently continue to be routine. 142
It might be observed that in each of these situations, the noncreditor
probably is or was in some sort of voluntary relationship with the debtor. The
foreclosure buyer in Wright had lent the debtor money and taken a security
interest in the debtor's property. The transferee in a fraudulent transfer typically
has consented, or at least not objected to, the transfer. The co-owner of property
with the debtor could seek to end the joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or
tenancy by the entirety. However, this observation does not distinguish the
examples given from the case of local taxation, because the payer of local taxes
typically has some voluntary relationship with the taxing entity. Residents
subject to property tax can move out of the city. Buyers paying sales or hotel
taxes can shop or stay elsewhere. Indeed, a leading model of local finance, the
Tiebout model, is built on the insight that payers can avoid a municipality's
taxes by forgoing the municipality's benefits. 143
Professor Thomas Plank has stressed the limits of the Bankruptcy Power.
He argues that bankruptcy law "may not expand the rights of debtors or their
creditors beyond that necessary to adjust their relationship, and it may not
otherwise adversely affect the rights or legal relations of Third Parties, that is,
persons who are neither the debtor nor creditors of the debtor."144 Assuming
that preemption of state tax limits is viewed as "adversely affect[ing] the
138. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2012).
139. See In re Persky, 134 B.R. 81, 105 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that
interests in property at issue-ownership and survivorship interest in property held by the entireties-
were not covered by § 363(h) and that § 363(h) exceeds Congress's constitutional powers).
140. See Persky, 134 B.R. at 94-99.
141. See In re Bernier, 176 B.R. 976, 984 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995) (holding that
Supreme Court precedent which defines the reach of the bankruptcy power "cannot even by implication
be read to protect non-creditor third party property rights from the collection-distribution scheme at the
core of the bankruptcy process where those rights are inextricably intertwined with those of a
bankruptcy estate").
142. See Sapir v. Sartorius, 230 B.R. 650. 654 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[Persky] is
rarely cited and never, to the best of this Court's knowledge, followed for the proposition that property
owned by the entireties is not subject to sale by a trustee under Section 363(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.
On the other hand, numerous cases decided in this Circuit and elsewhere since Persky . . . have
continued to apply Section 363(h) to authorize the sale of property owned as tenants by the entireties.").
Sapir's observation about the frequency of sales under § 363(h) has been cited with approval more
recently. See In re Prosser, No. 06-30009 (JKF), 2008 WL 2677863, at *3 n.5 (D.V.I. July 1, 2008).
143. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM.
ECON. REV., May 1981, at 93, 93.
144. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 114, at 1091; id. at 1064
("Congress may use its power to enact bankruptcy law only to adjust the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and his, her, or its creditors."); see also Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy,
supra note 114, at 563 ("Congress may not, in a bankruptcy law, appropriate the property or impair the
rights of third parties for the benefit of the insolvent debtor or his, her, or its creditors.").
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rights" of taxpayers or residents, and that they are "third parties," 45 Plank's
principle might dictate that such preemption is impermissible.
However, Plank's claim can be contested, at least in the field of municipal
bankruptcy, a subject that Plank does not address in this connection.1 46 Plank's
argument is principally an originalist one, based on detailed surveys of
bankruptcy law before and at the time of the Constitution. 147 Plank finds that
bankruptcy laws of this period did not provide for impairment of third-party
rights.1 48  However, this finding alone does not demonstrate that the
constitutional power was or is so limited, as Plank seems to recognize at one
point. 149 Indeed, scholars, including Plank,150 report no indication that Framing-
era law included municipal bankruptcy at all. 15i Yet municipal bankruptcy
presumably lies within Congress's power.
More broadly, the Supreme Court has rejected this form of originalist
analysis of the scope of the bankruptcy power. One of the clearest statements of
this rejection is in Adair v. Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings Ass'n,1 52
in which the Court found, "The powers granted by the bankruptcy clause of the
Constitution . . . are not limited to the bankruptcy law and practice in force in
England or the States at the time of its adoption."' 53 Other statements are in a
similar vein.15 4
145. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying discussion.
146. Plank does discuss municipal bankruptcy in connection with a second limit on
the Bankruptcy Power that he asserts: a requirement that debtors be insolvent to invoke bankruptcy
protection. See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 114, at 1093 & n.115; Plank,
Constitutional Limits ofBankruptcy, supra note 114, at 547.
147. See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 114, at 1076-89; Plank,
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, supra note 114, at 499-533; see also Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr.
Co. v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 668 (1935) ("[T]he notion that the framers of
the Constitution, by the bankruptcy clause, intended to limit the power of Congress to the then-existing
English law and practice upon the subject long since has been dispelled.").
148. See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 114, at 1066-67 (explaining
that the "Non-Expropriation Principle," one of four principles Plank derives from the original
understanding of the constitutional phrase "subject of Bankruptcies," dictates that "Congress may not ...
diminish ... the rights or prerogatives of parties outside of the debtor-creditor relationship"); Plank,
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, supra note 114, at 564.
149. See Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, supra note 114, at 528
("[Evidence of] an awareness of the English bankruptcy acts . . . does not by itself show an expectation
that Congress's powers would be limited by those acts.").
150. See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 114, at 1076-89 (not
mentioning the possibility of municipal bankruptcy); Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, supra
note 114, at 499-533 (not mentioning the possibility of municipal bankruptcy).
151. See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 78, at 6-15 (surveying English antecedents of
American bankruptcy laws, the drafting and adoption of the Constitution, and early American
bankruptcy law without mentioning municipal bankruptcy).
152. 303 U.S. 350 (1938).
153. Id. at 354.
154. See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 513 (1938) (stating of the
constitutional grant to legislate on the "subject of bankruptcies," "[i]t has been recognized that it is not
limited to the connotation of the phrase in England or the States, at the time of the formulation of the
Constitution"); Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 293 U.S. 648, 668
(1935) ("[T]he notion that the framers of the Constitution, by the bankruptcy clause, intended to limit
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Plank also argues that the "basic thrust of bankruptcy law since the early
1700s" supports the no-third-party-impairment principle. 5 5 However, as
discussed above,156 and as he recognizes, certain aspects of the Code do
violate the principle. Even assuming Plank is right that the Bankruptcy Code
usually does not allow for impairment of third-party rights, that argument may
show only that Congress has not seen fit to use the full extent of its power.
III. The Tenth Amendment
This Part argues that federal preemption of state tax limits in municipal
bankruptcy is consistent with the Tenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's
federalism decisions more broadly. First, it shows that under current law, the
question in evaluating state tax limit preemption under the Tenth Amendment
is whether the state validly consented to the arrangement. Second, it argues that
states can give valid consent to an arrangement that permits municipalities to
violate state law requirements, including the state constitution. Third, it argues
that state consent to a municipal bankruptcy system that includes state tax
preemption would not be found to be unduly coerced. Fourth, it answers two
objections: the objection that there is something unique about state taxation that
makes preemption unconstitutional and the objection that preemption is
unconstitutional because federalism protects individuals and not just states.
A. The Sufficiency of State Consent
It might be objected that the preemption of state tax limits in municipal
bankruptcy violates the Tenth Amendment because municipal taxation is
inherently or traditionally a local function and thus cannot be regulated by
Congress. The Supreme Court more or less agreed with this objection when it
invalidated the first municipal bankruptcy act in 1936. However, this decision
came in the midst of a shift in Tenth Amendment doctrine. Since the New
Deal-with a notable departure in the period 1976-1985-the Court has not
conceived of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the substantive subject matter
Congress can regulate. Instead, since the 1990s, the Tenth Amendment has
forbidden Congress to press state governments into service in support of its
regulatory programs. As a corollary, when a program is, on its face, voluntary
for a state, the Court has asked whether Congress has given the state a real
choice about participating or instead has effectively forced the state into service
by coercing its consent.
the power of Congress to the then existing English law and practice upon the subject long since has been
dispelled.").
155. Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, supra note 114, at 560.
156. See supra notes 135-142 and accompanying text.
157. See Plank, Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, supra note 114, at 564-81 (noting
that certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code violate the asserted requirement that Congress not create
direct benefits or liabilities for non-debtors and noncreditors that do not exist outside of bankruptcy).
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1. Municipal Bankruptcy Is Upheld as the Court Changes Its View of the
Tenth Amendment
The view of the relationship between state and federal power that
prevailed at the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries has been called "dual federalism."' 58 Dual federalism held that federal
and state governments were separate sovereigns with separate zones of
authority.1 59 Accordingly, the Court held during this period-contrary to earlier
precedents dating back to Gibbons v. Ogden 60-that the Tenth Amendment
"reserved a zone of activities to the states and that even federal laws within the
scope of the commerce clause were unconstitutional if they invaded that
zone."1 61 Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause was also limited by
the principle of dual federalism during this period.162 This principle was an
important part of the context in which the first municipal bankruptcy statute
was passed, held to violate the Tenth Amendment, and replaced with a nearly
identical statute that the Court found did not invade state sovereignty.
The first municipal bankruptcy statute (the "1934 Act") was enacted in
response to a widespread crisis of local insolvency that arose from the Great
Depression. 163 Mindful of the Tenth Amendment as then understood, legislators
included provisions intended to preserve state authority. The 1934 Act provided
that nothing in it should "be construed to limit or impair the power of any State
to control by legislation or otherwise any political subdivision thereof in the
exercise of its political or governmental powers." 164 The federal court was
forbidden to "interfere with any of the political or governmental powers of the
taxing district."1 65 Only voluntary petitions were permitted-municipalities
158. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
256 (5th ed. 2015).
159. Id.
160. See 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824). ("[T]he sovereignty of Congress, though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects."). The Court held that state sovereignty did
not impose an independent limit on Congress's exercise of its enumerated powers.
161. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 158, at 256; see also Hammer v. Dagenhardt, 247
U.S. 251, 275 (1918) (invalidating federal law prohibiting shipment of products of mines that employed
child labor on the ground that the law in effect regulated production, a "matter purely local," and
therefore infringed "the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the states in the Tenth
Amendment to the Constitution").
162. See Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
163. See Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-251, § 78, 48 Stat. 798, 798,
invalidated by Ashton, 298 U.S. 513 ("There is hereby ... declared to exist a national emergency caused
by increasing financial difficulties of many local governmental units . , . ."); see also Gillette & Skeel,
supra note 7, at 1167 (describing circumstances under which 1934 Act was passed).
164. Act of May 24, 1934 § 80(k).
165. Id. § 80(c)(l 1). Identical provisions remain part of Chapter 9 today. See II
U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (mandating that chapter does not "limit or impair the power of a State to control, by
legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or
governmental powers of such municipality"); id. § 904(1) (forbidding courts from interfering with "any
of the political or governmental powers of the debtor").
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could not be forced into federal bankruptcy proceedings against their will.166
Underscoring the intended effect of these provisions, one of the sections of the
Judiciary Committee's report on the bill was headed, "The Bill Does Not
Extend the Federal Jurisdiction over the States or Any of Their
Subdivisions."1 67
These provisions were not enough for the Supreme Court. In Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, the Supreme Court
invalidated the 1934 Act. The reasoning of Ashton rested squarely on the "dual
federalism" theory, specifically holding that Congress may not legislate on
inherently local matters.1 69
One might argue that the 1934 Act did not restrict municipal or state
control over local affairs because participation was voluntary. 170 Indeed, Justice
Cardozo stressed this point in his dissent.' For its part, the majority dismissed
any notion that the voluntary nature of the statute mattered. Preserving the
separation between the spheres of authority of federal and state government
was paramount. The majority wrote, "The sovereignty of the state essential to
its proper functioning under the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it
cannot be taken away by any form of legislation."I72 The Ashton majority saw
no difference between voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy: "[i]f voluntary
proceedings may be permitted, so may involuntary ones . . . "173
Congress enacted a new municipal bankruptcy statute ("the 1937 Act")
the next year.174 Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Ashton, the new statute
was extremely similar to the old one and did little more to protect state
sovereignty. The committee report on the 1937 Act listed several provisions of
the statute that were supposed to protect it from constitutional challenge, all of
which had been included in the 1934 Act. 75 Other provisions that enhanced
166. Act of May 24, 1934 § 80(a). Another provision provided that if state law gave
fiscal control over a municipality to a special agency, that agency's permission was required for the
municipality's bankruptcy petition. Id § 80(k).
167. H.R. REP. No. 73-207, at 2 (1934).
168. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
169. See id. at 529 (appealing to "the independence of the national and state
governments within their respective spheres" and to "the provisions of the Constitution which look to
the maintenance of the dual system").
170. Id. at 530 (noting that municipal bankruptcy "might materially restrict [the
municipality's] control over its fiscal affairs").
171. Id. at 538-40 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (stressing consensual nature of municipal
bankruptcy under the 1934 Act observing that the states may tax federal instrumentalities with consent,
and arguing that the federal government may tax states with consent).
172. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 530.
174. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653.
175. The report cited the following provisions, each of which was contained in the
1934 Act: (1) "No interference with the fiscal or governmental powers of a subdivision is permitted,"
H.R. REP. No. 75-517, at 2 (1937); Act of May 24, 1934 § 80(c)(1 1)(a), (2) "The taxing agency itself is
the only instrumentality which can seek the benefits of the proposed legislation," H.R. REP. No. 75-517,
at 2; Act of May 24, 1934 § 80(a)); and "[N]o control or jurisdiction over that property and those
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protection of state power were modest.176 Indeed, one of the changes Congress
made in 1937 actually cut back on state authority: The 1937 Act removed the
1934 Act's explicit provision that states had the power to require state
permission to file. 177 In short, the 1934 Act, already respectful of state
sovereignty in many ways, did not undergo significant state-autonomy-
enhancing change in 1937.
Despite the resemblance between the 1934 and 1937 Acts, the Supreme
Court upheld the new statute against a Tenth Amendment challenge in United
States v. Bekins. Reversing course from Ashton, the Court made state consent
the centerpiece of its analysis. The Court began by finding that California had
given its consent for the debtor, a California irrigation district, to seek
bankruptcy protection.1 79 Then, drawing on the examples of international
treaties, interstate compacts, and contracts between states and individuals,' 80
the Court held that "[i]t is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make
contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental
power."' The Court observed that consent to municipal bankruptcy enabled
federal-state cooperation to solve the problem of municipal insolvency and
found that the state could not solve the problem on its own because the federal
Constitution prohibited states from impairing contracts.182 It concluded that
when the state cooperates with the federal government in this way, it "acts in
aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers."1 83 The fact of state consent
to municipal bankruptcy, rather than the substantive protections of state power
in the municipal bankruptcy statute, were at the core of the Court's analysis.
Bekins appears to be a stop along the way to the eventual abandonment of
the dual-federalism's bar against federal invasion of state sovereignty, even
with the state's consent. As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky puts it, from the New
Deal era until 1976, the Court "expressly rejected the view that the Tenth
Amendment is an independent limit on the legislative power and instead
viewed it simply as a reminder that Congress may legislate only if there is
revenues of the petitioning agency necessary for essential governmental purposes is conferred by the
bill," H.R. REP. No. 75-517, at 2; Act of May 24, 1934 § 80(c)(1 1)(b)).
176. Congress changed the eligibility provision so that only specific listed types of
state agencies or instrumentalities, such as cities, drainage districts, and local improvement districts,
could file. Act of Aug. 16, 1937, § 81(1)-(6). The 1934 Act had allowed "[a]ny municipality or other
political subdivision of any State" to seek federal bankruptcy protection. Act of May 24, 1934 § 80(a).
The change apparently was intended to reduce the risk that a filing entity would be held to be a "political
subdivision[] [of the state] exercising sovereign powers." H.R. REP. No. 75-517, at 3.
177. Compare Act of May 24, 1934 § 83(i), with Act of Aug. 16, 1937 § 80(k). This
change may not have made much difference because the 1937 Act still required that the municipality be
authorized by law to take any actions needed to carry out the reorganization plan. Act of Aug. 16, 1937
§ 80(e)(6).
178. 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
179. Id. at 47.
180. Id. at 52.
181. Id. at 51-52.
182. Id. at 53-54.
183. Id. at 54.
419
Yale Journal on Regulation
authority in the Constitution."1 84 Characteristic of this period was United States
v. Darby, in which the Court famously stated that the Tenth Amendment "states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."185 This
statement can be understood as rejecting the notion that the Tenth Amendment
is an independent limit on federal power.
2. The Tenth Amendment's Two Revivals: National League of Cities and
the Supreme Court's "New Federalism" Cases of the 1990s
Since the Darby era, the Supreme Court has twice reinvigorated the Tenth
Amendment and associated notions of federalism. The first effort lasted from
1976 to 1985, when the Court prohibited the use of enumerated powers to
regulate the states in the performance of their "traditional governmental
functions." The second effort started in 1992 and continues to this day: the
Court now prohibits Congress from conscripting the state governments to carry
out federal programs, including conscription through "coerced" consent.
The Supreme Court temporarily revived the idea that the federal
government may not use its enumerated powers to regulate certain inherently
local matters between 1976 and 1985. In National League of Cities v. Usery,
the Court found that a federal statute requiring state and local governments to
pay minimum wages was unconstitutional.186 The four-justice plurality opinion
stated that because the law "operate[d] to directly displace the States' freedom
to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,"
Congress had no power under the Commerce Clause to enact it. The attempt
to regulate the states as states "transgresse[d] an affirmative limitation"
contained in the Tenth Amendment that applied "even when [Congress]
exercise[ed] its otherwise plenary power[] ... to regulate commerce." 88
The Court declined several times to extend the holding of National
League of Cities v. Usery beyond its facts,189 and explicitly overruled the
184. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 158, at 332.
185. 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941).
186. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
187. Id. at 852.
188. Id. at 842.
189. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1983) (holding that it was
permissible for Congress to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state and local
governments because the Act does not "directly impair the State's ability to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions" (internal citation omitted)); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 759-60, 764 (1982) (holding that it is not a violation of the Tenth Amendment for a federal
statute to require state utility commissions to consider adopting federal proposals and to resolve disputes
under the portion of the statute that preempted state law); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
455 U.S. 678, 685 (1982) (holding that the Tenth Amendment did not prohibit application of Railway
Labor Act to state-owned railroad because the "operation of a railroad engaged in interstate commerce is
not an integral part of traditional state activities"); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 293 (1981) (holding that National League of Cities does not apply to federal regulation of
individual business); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 158, at 333-36.
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decision in 1985 in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.190
The Court found that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory
immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of
federalism." 19 1 Garcia seems to indicate that Congress is not barred from acting
in the area of municipal taxation, assuming the action is within the bankruptcy
power, simply because municipal taxation is a traditional governmental
function. Indeed, Garcia's rejection of the traditional-governmental-function
limit on Congress's power survives to this day. The Supreme Court's
subsequent revitalization of the Tenth Amendment proceeded along a different
line.
The Court's second revival of the Tenth Amendment began in 1992, when
it decided New York v. United States.192 The Court did not return to the notion
that Congress cannot regulate certain inherently local subjects.' 93 Instead, the
Court started with the proposition that Congress may not order states to carry
out a federal regulatory program,1 94 and rejected the statute at issue on the
ground that it did what was prohibited: the statute "commandeer[ed]" the states
to carry out a federal program.' 95 Importantly, the Court reached this
conclusion even though the statute gave states a choice whether to carry out the
program or not. The statute "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement
from coercion."' 96
Specifically, the statute forced the states to choose between two
alternatives, and Congress lacked the power to compel the state to carry out
either one of them. It required each state either to provide for the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste generated within its borders or to take title to the
waste. 197 The Court found that Congress lacked the power to order the states to
take title. Requiring the states to carry out Congress's regulatory scheme in this
way would unconstitutionally "'commandeer' state governments into the
service of federal regulatory purposes."l98 Nor could Congress order the states
to provide for disposal of the waste, because Congress may not "present a
190. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that it was constitutional for Congress to apply Fair
Labor Standards Act to a metropolitan transit authority).
191. Id. at 531.
192. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
193. The Court wrote that it did not matter whether the inquiry was characterized as
finding the outer limits on the power delegated to Congress or as determining whether the "core of
sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment" was invaded. Id. at 159. It stated that
the two inquiries were "mirror images" of one another, id. at 156, and that "just as a cup may be half
empty or half full, it makes no difference" how the question before it was characterized, id. at 159. The
Court did not, however, state that there was a sphere of activity in which the states could regulate and
Congress cannot.
194. Id at 161.
195. Id. at 175-76.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 151.
198. Id. at 175.
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simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by
Congress." 99 Accordingly, Congress could not require states to choose one of
the alternatives: "A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory
techniques is no choice at all."200 Even though the states could choose not to
carry out Congress's program (providing for disposal) by deciding to take title
instead, that was a false choice because Congress lacked the power to order
either alternative. The absence of valid consent to the regulatory program was
the touchstone of New York.201
Five years after New York, in Printz v. United States,202 the Supreme
Court applied the anti-commandeering principle to a federal command to state
executive officers, holding that the "Federal Government may . . . [not]
command the States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." 203 Accordingly, the Court
held that a statute requiring local law enforcement officials to perform
background checks on gun purchasers was unconstitutional.204 The Court
expressly noted that it was deciding that the federal government could not
require participation in the program, leaving open the possibility that a purely
voluntary background-check program would be permissible.205
The Court picked up where New York left off and further elaborated on its
views on coercion recently in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius ("NFIB").206 In that case, the Court considered the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, which, among other things, put states to a choice
between expanding Medicaid eligibility and losing all Medicaid funds. Many
states objected, and the Court agreed that Congress had "crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion."207 The Court found that the
Medicaid expansion was a new program,208 and characterized the funds that
199. Id. at 175-76.
200. Id. at 176.
201. It is also noteworthy that the state officials' alleged consent in New York v.
United States did not consist of the kind of official state and local government acts typically involved in
authorizing and seeking municipal bankruptcy. Instead, New York's officials' "consent" took the form
of congressional testimony by a deputy commissioner of the state's Energy Office and a speech by one
of the state's senators in favor of the act in question. Id. at 181. By contrast, municipal bankruptcy
typically involves a state statute authorizing the municipality to file, followed by a formal decision of
the municipality's governing body to make the filing, with the filing potentially subject to review by
another state body.
202. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
203. Id. at 935.
204. Id. at 902-04.
205. See id at 910-11 (stating that the "critical point here" is whether Congress "could
impose these responsibilities without the consent of the States") (emphasis added); id. at 934 (discussing
possibility that some local officials have "chosen, voluntarily, to participate in administration of the
federal scheme").
206. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
207. Id. at 2603 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992)).
208. Id. at 2605-06 (holding that the Medicaid expansion "accomplishes a shift in
kind, not merely degree," because after the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid "is no longer a program to
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states stood to lose if they did not adopt this "new program" as "over 10
percent" of the states' overall budgets.209 The pre-ACA Medicaid spending was
an "independent grant[]," 210  and Congress's threat to take away that
independent grant was "a means of pressuring the State to accept policy
changes."211 Because the pressure was too intense-a "gun to the head" in the
212Court's view -the states could not "voluntarily and knowingly accept[] the
terms of the contract" Congress offered.213
Thus, the focus of current Tenth Amendment analysis is on whether the
state is forced to carry out a federal regulatory program. If the state has a choice
about whether to carry out the program, as it does in the case of municipal
bankruptcy, then the question is whether that choice is "coerced." After Garcia,
the focus is not on the subject of the federal statute.214 In New York, the Court
did not ask whether nuclear waste disposal policy was central to state
sovereignty. In Printz, the Court did not ask whether law enforcement, or gun-
control policy, was central to state sovereignty. 215 In NFIB, the court did not
ask whether Medicare policy was central to state sovereignty. Under current
law, the question raised by federal preemption of state tax limits in municipal
bankruptcy is not whether taxation is central to state sovereignty, but whether
the choice presented to state governments by the municipal bankruptcy statute
is unduly coercive.
As applied to preemption of state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy, the
Court's Tenth Amendment cases suggest that the Court would not invalidate
the preemption simply because it involves state taxation. Under its recent
precedents, the Court might not permit Congress to force the states to
care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide
universal health care insurance").
209. Id. at 2605.
210. Id. at 2604.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2602 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
214. The Court has relied on the idea of the "usual constitutional balance of federal
and state powers" in the context of statutory interpretation; it has given statutes a narrow reading to
avoid "upset[ting]" that balance. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also id. at 464-67
(invoking the plain statement rule to resolve ambiguity and find that state judges are "appointee[s] on
the policymaking level" and therefore not protected by Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Bond
v. United States, 134 S Ct. 2077, 2089-90 (2014) (citing and quoting Gregory in finding that a federal
statute making it a criminal offense to possess or use chemical weapons did not reach "purely local
crimes"). Any revision to the Bankruptcy Code to preempt state tax limits should be drafted plainly with
these precedents in mind. The proposal described in Section IB, supra, is intended to meet that
standard.
215. Printz does state, "[iut is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty
that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of autonomy." Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997). However, the Court found that Congress violated this "independence
and autonomy" when it "'dragooned"' local officials into national service. Id. The Court did not focus
on the nature of the service into which the local officials were "dragooned." What was important, at
least according to the Court, was that the local officials were pressed into federal service, not that they
were pressed into the federal service of background checks.
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participate in its municipal bankruptcy scheme.26 However, states are not
forced. They can choose whether to authorize bankruptcy for their
municipalities. The next Section argues that states can give valid consent to a
municipal bankruptcy regime that includes preemption of state tax limits.
B. State Consent and State Constraints
Municipal bankruptcy is voluntary. States have a choice about whether to
participate and many decline to do so. Thus, as shown in the preceding Section,
the Tenth Amendment would not bar preemption of state tax limits in
municipal bankruptcy as long as a state gives valid consent to participation in a
municipal bankruptcy regime that includes such preemption. This Section
argues that a state may give valid consent to a municipal bankruptcy system
that authorizes municipalities to propose plans that would otherwise violate
state law, including the state constitution.
State consent to municipal bankruptcy empowers a municipality to
propose a plan of adjustment that contains provisions that would otherwise
violate the state constitution. Although this conclusion may seem surprising
when stated so plainly, it is implicit in Bekins and has been made explicit in
later decisions, most recently the high-profile bankruptcies of Detroit and
Stockton.
In Bekins, the Court found that municipal bankruptcy "relie[ves]" debtors
by allowing them to propose plans in which contracts are impaired, even
though state or municipal impairment of contracts would otherwise be
forbidden by the Federal Constitution.217 When Congress acts within the
bankruptcy power, it can authorize municipal acts that would otherwise violate
the federal constitution. Implicit in Bekins's holding that municipalities may
propose plans that impair contracts is a finding that they can propose plans that
would violate the state constitution. That is because state constitutions, no less
216. The Court might permit nonconsensual municipal bankruptcy if it were to find
that there is something special about the bankruptcy power that trumps the Tenth Amendment, as
suggested by Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). In Katz, the Court
rejected claim of several Virginia colleges that their sovereign immunity barred a liquidating supervisor
in bankruptcy from recovering certain pre-bankruptcy transfers from them. Id. at 360. The Court relied
on the "unique history" of the bankruptcy power, id. at 369 n.9, holding that at the time of the Framing,
"the power to enact bankruptcy legislation was understood to carry with it the power to subordinate state
sovereignty, albeit within a limited sphere," id. at 377, and that the states "agreed in the plan of the
[Constitutional] Convention not to assert" sovereign immunity, id. at 373. Although the specific doctrine
at issue in Katz was sovereign immunity, the decision's logic would appear to apply to the Tenth
Amendment as well, as Jonathan Lipson has suggested. See Lipson, supra note 103, at 643. Although a
recent decision finds that sovereign immunity does apply in municipal bankruptcy, the decision relies
heavily on a policy of avoiding "the sort of interference with the State's control of its fiscal affairs that
the Supreme Court sought to avoid" in Bekins. In re City of San Bernardino, No. ED CV 13-01797 SJO,
2014 WL 2511096, at *13 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2014). In emphasizing the substantive reservations of state
power in the 1937 Act, the Court does not grapple with the consent-based rationale of Bekins.
217. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) (noting that in municipal
bankruptcy, Congress uses the bankruptcy power to overcome "the restriction imposed by the Federal
Constitution upon the impairment of contracts by state legislation").
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than the federal one, contain impairment of contracts clauses.218 California's
constitution contained such a clause when Bekins was litigated and decided,219
yet the Court held that the California irrigation district in Bekins could propose
a plan that impaired contracts. Impairment of contracts is ordinarily forbidden
by both federal and state constitutions, but is permitted in the context of a
municipal bankruptcy plan. That is, municipal bankruptcy plans, proposed
under a municipal bankruptcy statute that is a legitimate exercise of the
bankruptcy power, can contain provisions that would otherwise violate state
constitutions.
What was implicit in Bekins became explicit in Mission Independent
School District v. Texas.220 There, the Texas Constitution expressly forbade the
legislature from authorizing the release of any indebtedness to the state. Yet the
Fifth Circuit held that the district court should have confirmed a plan proposed
by the debtor school district even though the plan released the school district's
debt to the state.221 The state constitutional provision could not "stand in the
way of the operation of the Bankruptcy Act" if the prerequisites for plan
confirmation were met.222 The municipality was allowed to do in bankruptcy
that which the state constitution forbade it to do outside bankruptcy.
The recent Detroit223 and Stockton224 decisions provide further explicit
confirmation of the principle that state constitutional constraints give way in
bankruptcy. In these cases, objecting parties argued that what the municipalities
proposed to do in bankruptcy impaired or could impair obligations in violation
of the state constitution. The courts turned back these challenges. In so doing,
they relied on the proposition that when a state authorizes municipal
bankruptcy, it accedes to all provisions of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code-
even if those provisions authorize actions otherwise prohibited by the state
constitution.
In Stockton, retirees asked the bankruptcy court to enjoin the city not to
reduce retiree health benefits, arguing that the planned reduction violated the
225
contracts clauses of the federal and California constitutions. The court
218. Currently, it appears that impairment of contracts clauses appear in thirty-nine
state constitutions. Impairment of Contracts: 50-State Survey, July 21, 2016 (on file with author). Cf
GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 62 (1977) (reporting that thirty-eight state constitutions contained
impairment-of-contracts clauses).
219. The irrigation district in Bekins presented its petition for confirmation of its plan
of composition on September 21, 1937. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 46. Both the 1937 and 1939 versions of the
California Constitution contain clauses forbidding impairment of contracts. See CAL. CONST. of 1937
art. 1, § 16 ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall
ever be passed."); CAL. CONST. of 1939 art. 1, § 16 (same). The provision dates back to the Constitution
of 1849. See CAL. CONST. of 1849 art. I, § 16 (same).
220. 116 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1940).
221. Id. at 179.
222. Id.
223. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
224. In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
225. Id. at 14, 16.
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rejected the challenges.226 It held that the Bankruptcy Clause authorized
contract impairment that would otherwise violate the federal Contracts
227Clause. In so doing it held that "[t]he federal bankruptcy power also, by
operation of the Supremacy Clause, trumps the similar contracts clause in the
California state constitution."22 8 Because the bankruptcy power embraces the
impairment of contracts, wrote the court, the state's contracts clause gave
229
way.
The Detroit court reached the same result. It rejected contentions that the
state constitution's clauses protecting contracts and pensions constrained the
municipality's bankruptcy plan. In a section of the opinion headed "When the
State Consents to a Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment Does Not
Prohibit the Impairment of Contract Rights That Are Otherwise Protected by
the State Constitution," 230 the court found that "[t]he state constitutional
provisions prohibiting the impairment of contracts and pensions impose no
constraint on the bankruptcy process." 231 The court implicitly dismissed the
argument that a state cannot consent to an arrangement that allows its
instrumentality, the municipality, to violate the state constitution. Specifically,
the court held that "with state consent, the adjustment of municipal debts does
not impermissibly intrude on state sovereignty."232 The separate provision of
the Michigan Constitution that expressly protects pensions from being
"diminished or impaired"233 also gave way in municipal bankruptcy. The court
held that pensions stood on the same footing as any other contract right and
234thus could be impaired.
Nor could objecting parties argue that state constitutional impairments
clauses are preserved by § 903 of the Bankruptcy Code, which reserves state
control over municipalities. The Stockton court observed that the reservation in
§ 903 "is limited by the Supremacy Clause. A state cannot rely on the § 903
reservation of power to condition or to qualify, i.e., to 'cherry pick,' the
application of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in chapter 9 cases
after such a case has been filed." 235 A state may not use its law to "revise
226. Id. at 30.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 16.
229. Id. at 15-16.
230. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
231. Id.
232. Id
233. MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 24 (2016).
234. See Detroit, 504 B.R. at 150-54. The discussion fell under the heading "Under
the Michigan Constitution, Pension Rights Are Contractual Rights."
235. In re City of Stockton, 478 BR. 8, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012); see also Mission
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175, 176-78 (5th Cir. 1940) (holding that Texas could not exclude
its own bonds from impairment in municipal bankruptcy); In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 75-76
(E.D. Cal. 2010) ("[B]y authorizing the use of chapter 9 by its municipalities, California must accept
chapter 9 in its entirety; it cannot cherry pick what it likes while disregarding the rest."); In re City of
Stockton, 475 B.R. 720, 727-29 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) ("The state is the chapter 9 gatekeeper by virtue
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chapter 9."236 Similarly, the Detroit court stated, "[i]f the state consents to a
municipal bankruptcy, it consents to the application of chapter 9 of the
bankruptcy code." 237
It might be argued that if municipal bankruptcy authorization permits the
municipality to violate the state constitution's impairment of contracts clause,
that makes the authorization itself a violation of the state constitution. A recent
student note makes this argument, asserting that "state constitutional contract
impairment clauses prohibit state authorization of chapter 9 bankruptcy filings,
except in the very rare cases of municipalities with absolutely no contractual
obligations." 238 The Detroit court expressly rejected such an argument, finding
that "if a state consents to a municipal bankruptcy, no state law can protect
contractual pension rights from impairment in bankruptcy, just as no law could
protect any other types of contract rights." 239 The court relied on the implicit
proposition that it is constitutional for a state to authorize municipal
bankruptcy, even if municipal bankruptcy permits municipalities to take actions
that otherwise would violate the state constitution.
Although the Detroit court did not analyze the issue in depth, a contrary
conclusion would undermine municipal bankruptcy itself. Every municipal
bankruptcy case in which the municipality received a discharge of debt despite
a state constitutional impairment contracts clause can be seen as an implicit
endorsement of the proposition that a state may constitutionally empower its
municipalities to take actions in bankruptcy that would otherwise violate the
state constitution.
As long as Congress is acting within the bankruptcy power and the state
consents to municipal bankruptcy, Congress can authorize municipalities to
take actions in municipal bankruptcy that would otherwise violate state
constitutional provisions. The very existence of municipal bankruptcy suggests
that this proposition is correct as to state constitutions' impairment of contracts
clauses. Further, the Detroit court held that Detroit could use bankruptcy to get
around the state constitution's impairment-of-pensions clause. Nor should
Congress's power in this regard be understood as limited to state laws
of § 109(c)(2). But that gatekeeping function ends once the gate is opened and a chapter 9 case is
filed."); In re Cty. of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996) ("By authorizing the use of
chapter 9 by its municipalities, California must accept chapter 9 in its entirety; it cannot cherry pick
what it likes while disregarding the rest."). At least one bankruptcy judge has taken a critical view of this
proposition. See Thomas B. Bennett, Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a Bekins Extrapolation
Too Far, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 3, 22 (2015) ("The espousal of some that a state's authorization of its
subdivisions to file a municipal bankruptcy case equates to it and others not being able to avoid
application of all sections of the Bankruptcy Code that are part of Chapter 9 is an overstatement of what
Bekins viewed as consent by a state in aid of its sovereign powers.").
236. Stockton, 478 B.R. at 17.
237. Detroit, 504 B.R. at 161.
238. Bradley Hull, Note, State Contract Impairment Clauses and the Validity of
Chapter 9 Authorization, 32 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 87, 90 (2015).
239. Detroit, 504 B.R. at 161.
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prohibiting impairment of contracts; as noted in Section II.A, Congress's power
to preempt state law is not so limited.
The principle explained in this section applies with as much force to
preemption of state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy: Congress can authorize
municipalities to take actions in municipal bankruptcy that would otherwise
violate constitutional state tax limits, as long as Congress is acting within the
bankruptcy power and the state consents. 240 The next Section addresses the
validity of state consent to a municipal bankruptcy system that preempts state
tax limits.
C. Consent to State Tax Limit Preemption
This Section argues that states' consent to a revised municipal bankruptcy
statute that preempts state tax limits would probably be found not to be
impermissibly coerced. First, preemption would likely be seen as aiding the
state's authority, not derogating from it. Second, even if preemption is viewed
as a string attached to the benefit of access to municipal bankruptcy, rather than
as a part of that benefit, it is probably permissible. State tax limit preemption
probably passes the test set forth in NFIB for permissible conditions on federal
benefits provided to states.
As discussed, state consent lay at the heart of Bekins,241 and the Detroit
and Stockton decisions also stressed the importance of consent.242 Indeed, the
Detroit court went so far as to state, "[t]he Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution is violated only when the state does not consent." 243 This
Section assumes that that statement is probably too broad. Under current Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, courts would probably look to the quality of
consent, not just the fact of consent.244
It is not clear that preemption of state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy
even raises questions about the quality of state consent. Questions about
unconstitutional conditions come into play when the federal government
proposes that the state give up something in exchange for a federal benefit,245
240. See discussion supra Part 11.
241. See discussion supra Section IIIA.I.
242. See Detroit, 504 B.R. at 144 ("At its core, Bekins rests on state consent.");
Stockton, 478 B.R. at 20 (stating that the "foundation" of federal-state relationship in municipal
bankruptcy contains "multiple levels of consent," including the state's consent to the municipality's
filing and the municipality's consent, evidenced by the facts that only voluntary filings are permitted and
that only the municipality can propose a plan of adjustment).
243. Detroit, 504 B.R. at 147.
244. See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
245. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) ("We
have repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as 'much in the nature of a contract'
(quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)); id. at 2602-03 (noting that the issue in
unconstitutional-condition analysis of spending programs is whether "a State has a legitimate choice to
accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal funds" (emphasis added)); Pennhurst St. Scb. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (noting that in a conditional spending program, "in return for
federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions" (emphasis added)).
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but municipal freedom from state constitutional limitations is something states
get, not something they give up. The proposal here is for the federal
government to give states and their instrumentalities more freedom from state
constitutional constraints. If increased taxes are needed for municipal financial
rehabilitation, freedom to raise them helps the state "save its agency which the
State itself is powerless to rescue." 246 The state is no more coerced by
preemption of its state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy than it is by
preemption of its impairment of contracts clause.
Similarly, the Court has described unconstitutional conditions as an
impermissible way of inducing the states to "act in accordance with federal
policies." 247 But the preemption of state tax limits can be described as lifting a
constraint on implementation of municipal policies. The proposed legislation
would free the municipality from state constitutional constraints that prevent it
from implementing its preferred tax policies, just as municipal bankruptcy
currently frees a municipality to implement its preferred debt adjustments.
Even if lifting state limits on municipal tax in bankruptcy is described as
constraining state discretion rather than as freeing it, the proposal probably
does not impose an unconstitutional condition. Signing onto the revised
municipal bankruptcy statute and thus signing on to preemption of state tax
limits increases local discretion, but the arrangement could potentially be seen
as limiting state authority because state constitutional provisions are abrogated.
If the proposed municipal bankruptcy statute is so viewed, NFIB provides
a useful framework for analysis. This is so even though NFIB was a case about
conditional spending, not bankruptcy. Professors Clayton Gillette and David
Skeel have argued that municipal bankruptcy with strings attached functions
similarly to a conditional block grant of money. In return for accepting the
federal government's conditions, the municipality gets access to money it
would not otherwise have.248 If Gillette and Skeel are right, NFIB is controlling
precedent. But in any event, attention to NFIB is appropriate because the case is
the Supreme Court's latest word on unconstitutional conditions.
Professor Samuel Bagenstos has identified three criteria that must be met
before a congressional conditional-spending program fails the test of NFIB:
"When Congress takes an (1) entrenched federal program (2) that provides
large sums to the states and (3) tells states that they can continue to participate
246. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938); see also In re City of Stockton,
478 B.R. 8, 20 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) ("Chapter 9 passed constitutional muster on the basis that the
federal bankruptcy power be exercised at the request of, but not at the expense of, the sovereign state in
an exercise of cooperation . . . .").
247. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added); see also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (holding that Congress may use conditional spending to "urge a State to adopt
a legislative program consistent with federal interests").
248. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 7, at 1210.
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in that program only if they also agree to participate in a separate and
independent program, the condition is unconstitutionally coercive." 249
Applying this framework to the proposed revised municipal bankruptcy
law, the condition is that the state must give up its constitutional limits on
municipal tax increases in return for use of the federal bankruptcy power to
adjust municipal debts. So viewed, the proposal probably passes NFIB, as
250interpreted by Bagenstos.
With respect to the first of Bagenstos's questions, the proposal might
affect an "entrenched federal program," particularly as to those states that have
already authorized their municipalities to file for bankruptcy. 25 1 But with
respect to the second question, municipal bankruptcy arguably is not like a
program that provides large sums to the states because municipal bankruptcy
has provided only a small amount of money relative to state budgets252 and
because the program is not too attractive to turn down.253 As for the third
question, lifting state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy should not be seen as a
separate and independent program from the rest of municipal bankruptcy.
Creditor recovery is a central function of bankruptcy, and municipal
bankruptcy in particular has always been concerned with municipalities'
repayment of their debt through taxes. 254
D. Arguments That State Consent Is Insufficient
This Article has argued that state consent is the touchstone in analyzing
the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy, and therefore of analyzing the
constitutionality of preempting state tax limits. This Section addresses two
arguments that might be leveled against the Article's contentions.
249. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 866 (2013) (emphasis and numbering added); see also Samuel R.
Bagenstos, Viva Conditional Federal Spending, 37 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 95 (2014) (expressing
a similar view). The NFIB framework is formalistic and does not focus on the substantive fairness of the
exchange between the federal government and the states. Bekins suggested in passing an inquiry that
does focus on substance. See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53 (noting that the Constitution permits the state to
agree to conditions "that will assure a fair and just requital for benefits received" (quoting Charles C.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 501 U.S. 548, 595-96 (1937)). It seems likely that preemption of state tax
limits is a "fair and just requital" for the benefit of a federal discharge, but further development of the
Bekins test would be needed to say anything with confidence.
250. Cf Hunt, supra note 25, at 556-68 (applying Bagenstos's framework to question
whether judicial requirement to raise taxes in bankruptcy is an unconstitutional condition).
251. See H. SLAYTON DABNEY, JR. ET AL., MUNICIPALITIES IN PERIL: THE ABI GUIDE
TO CHAPTER 9 11 (2d ed. 2012) ("Approximately half of the states do not permit municipalities to file at
all.").
252. See Hunt, supra note 25, at 567 n.297 (observing that Detroit, the largest
municipal bankruptcy in history, involved total debt (not debt reduction) of one third of Detroit's budget
for one year, while the Medicaid expansion analyzed in NFIB involved ten percent of the average
affected state's budget every year).
253. See DABNEY, supra note 251, at 11.
254. See supra Section II.B. 1.
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First, this Section answers the argument that there is something special
about municipal taxes qua taxes-as distinct from their status as traditionally
local matters-that would make the proposal unconstitutional. Despite many
statements that taxes are central to sovereignty, courts have not established
rules governing state tax laws' possible immunity from preemption. At the
same time, Congress has preempted state tax laws in many areas. The
consensus view of scholars seems to be that Congress has wide discretion to
preempt state tax laws. Moreover, the main concern expressed about
preemption of state tax laws is the need to protect state and local fiscal health,
and the proposal here would tend to enhance local finances.
Second, this Section confronts the argument that state consent to federal
programs is insufficient because federalism protects individuals as well as
states. This principle might, in certain applications, undermine the state-
consent-based framework that currently prevails in municipal bankruptcy.
However, the Court simply has not explored the implications of the proposition
that federalism protects individuals in enough depth to permit an informed
assessment of the proposition's impact.
1. State Taxation as a Reserved State Domain
Although Tenth Amendment analysis has moved away from asking
whether the specific activity in question is fundamental or central to
sovereignty, it is worth discussing whether state taxation is special. Both
scholars and the Supreme Court have stated that taxation is fundamental to state
sovereignty.255 In the words of Professor Michael McConnell, "The power of
taxation is as much at the core of sovereignty as anything could possibly be:
The American Revolution was fought over the proposition of no taxation
without representation." 256 Emily Johnson and Professor Ernest Young have
argued that it would be "an extraordinary exercise of federal power" to
"empower the bankruptcy court to enjoin the operation of state laws that
prevent necessary taxing or spending, while leaving the actual execution of the
tax to state authorities." 257
Such an argument could find some support in language used in Bekins.
Although the main focus of Bekins was consent, the opinion does reflect some
concern with what precisely the states consented to. In particular, the Court
mentioned the sovereignty-preserving provisions of the 1937 Act, such as the
requirement that "the action of the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of
255. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (1994) (holding
that the taxation authority of state government is "central to state sovereignty"). Michael Fatale has
collected additional cases in this vein. See Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Preemptions ofState Tax, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 41, 42 n.3.
256. McConnell, supra note 7, at 234.
257. Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7
DUKE J. CONsT. L. & PUB. POL'Y, 117, 161 n.226 (2012) (emphasis added). Johnson and Young made
this assertion in the course of evaluating a proposal for a mandatory bankruptcy regime for states.
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composition . . . [be] authorized by state law." 258 The Court also held that state
consent protects a cooperative federal-state program against a Tenth
Amendment challenge "if the essence of . . . statehood is maintained without
impairment." 259 These observations were made in passing and not integrated
into the analysis, but they might have some bite if taxation truly is special. For
example, one might argue that a municipal bankruptcy statute that includes
federal preemption of state tax limits fails to "maintain[]" the "essence of
statehood." 260
Despite frequent references to the importance of the states' power to tax to
state sovereignty, commentators have found that there are "no established
applicable judicial limitations" on Congress's power to preempt state tax
measures.261 Johnson and Young cite nothing indicating that the exercise of
federal power they deem "extraordinary" would actually be prohibited. In the
words of Professors David Gamage and Darien Shanske, the consensus view,
although one not universally shared,262 seems to be that "the federal
government almost certainly can impose significant restrictions on state taxing
power, though within limits." 263 Indeed, the federal government already has
preempted state taxation in many areas.264
It might be argued that state tax limits are entitled to greater protection
than state taxes themselves, particularly for limits that were adopted by popular
vote. Such an argument may be answered by observing, again, that state
governments consent to municipal bankruptcy.265 Moreover, when the Supreme
Court upheld Proposition 13 against constitutional challenge, it did not rely on
any proposition that initiatives are entitled to greater deference than laws
258. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51 (1938). Among the sovereignty-
preserving provisions mentioned by the Court were voluntariness of proceedings, state-law authorization
to carry out the reorganization plan, noninterference with municipal fiscal or governmental affairs, and
the absence of judicial control or jurisdiction over property and revenues necessary for essential
governmental purposes. Id. at 50-51.
259. Id. at 53.
260. Id.
261. Fatale, supra note 255, at 43; see also David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The
Federal Government's Power to Restrict State Taxation, 81 ST. TAX NOTEs 547, 547 (2016) (stating
that there is "no clear guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court" on the extent of Congress's power to
preempt state taxes).
262. See Fatale, supra note 255, at 45 (arguing that Congress's state-tax preemption
authority under Commerce Clause is limiting to preempting state taxes that amount to "state-based
economic protectionism").
263. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 261, at 553.
264. Id. at 551 (noting federal preemption of direct state taxation of the Internet, of
individuals "traveling in air commerce," of interstate travel by motor carrier, of the retirement income of
non-residents, and of the purchase of food with Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits, as
well as prohibition on state taxation that discriminates against railroads and on state taxation of interstate
motor fuels unless the state is a member of the International Fuel Tax Agreement). Gamage and Shanske
also call attention to the facts that ERISA broadly preempts state taxes and that the federal government
has capped the amount of franchise fees a cable company can be required to pay a state or local
government. Id. at 552.
265. See discussion supra Section III.B.
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adopted by legislatures; instead, it relied on precedents dealing with legislative
enactments in upholding the statute.266
Even if the Court were inclined to protect state taxation as such, there are
reasons to think the state tax limit preemption would pass muster. First, as
discussed, courts have embraced a notion of consent in the municipal
bankruptcy context under which state autonomy would be enhanced, not
limited, by preempting state tax limits.267 Second, the leading commentator
advancing the view that Congress's power to preempt state law is sharply
limited emphasizes the original understanding and current reality that states
need taxes to fund their governments.268 Under the proposal here, Congress is
making it easier, not harder, for local governments to fund themselves. Finally,
even if the proposal is viewed as an intrusion on state taxing authority, the
intrusion is sharply limited. It applies only in the comparatively rare case of
municipal bankruptcy and preserves the ultimate decision about whether to
raise taxes to the local or state authorities in charge of the bankrupt
municipality.
2. Federalism as an Individual Protection
The view that federalism limits federal power to protect individual rights,
as well as to "preserve[] the integrity, dignity, and residual sovereignty of the
States,"269 has been described as "increasingly dominant." 270 The Court has
found that because "[s]tates are not the sole intended beneficiaries of
federalism,'271 state consent to a federal program may not in itself be enough to
validate the program,272 at least if the arrangement amounts to "tyranny [or]
abuse." 273
266. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (citing the discretion of
legislatures to design tax laws in evaluating the constitutionality of Proposition 13); id at 15-16
(equating "legislatures" and "other governmental decisionmakers" (in context, state electorates) for
purposes of constitutional analysis).
267. See discussion supra Section Ill.A.
268. See Fatale, supra note 255, at 44-45; see also Gamage & Shanske, supra note
261, at 551 n.35 (collecting cases in which the Supreme Court has expressed solicitude for the states'
ability to raise revenue).
269. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011).
270. McConnell, supra note 7, at 235.
271. Bond, 564 U.S. at 222; see also id. ("[T]he individual liberty secured by
federalism is not simply derivative of the rights of the States.").
272. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) ("Where Congress
exceeds its authority relative to the States, therefore, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be
ratified by the 'consent' of state officials."); see also Bond, 564 U.S. at 222 ("Fidelity to principles of
federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.").
273. New York, 505 U.S. at 181-82 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) ("[A] healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.").
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Although the Court has been emphatic in stating that federalism protects
individual rights,274  it has not actually found any federal statute
unconstitutional despite otherwise valid state consent because the statute
tyrannized or abused individuals. 275 Thus, we have little guidance about the
scope or operation of the principle that federalism protects individual rights.
Consider New York v. United States, the first of the recent cases to assert
that federalism protects individual rights. The observation seems unnecessary
to the outcome. The Court found that Congress offered New York an
unconstitutionally coercive choice between regulating as Congress desired or
taking title to nuclear waste.276 It then went on to observe, based on the premise
that federalism protects individuals,277 that "[s]tate officials . . . cannot consent
to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the
Constitution."278 In context, this statement seems to mean simply that if the
choice is impermissibly coercive, states (or their officials)279 cannot consent to
280being bound to make the impermissible choice that Congress has devised.
The Court's observation about federalism and individuals does not seem to
have any particular import when the state's choice is not impermissibly
coerced.
Broad application of this principle-that state consent does not matter
because federalism also protects individuals-threatens to upend municipal
bankruptcy, at least as it is currently conceived. Not just Detroit and Stockton,
but also Bekins rests on the proposition that state consent is what matters. For
this reason, we might expect the Court to hesitate before applying the idea that
federalism protects individuals in this context. Indeed, the Court might find the
proposal to preempt state tax limits salutary, rather than "abusive" or
"tyrannical." It might be influenced by arguments such as those presented in
274. See Bond, 564 U.S. at 221 (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458) ("Federalism
secures the freedom of the individual."); New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (noting that federalism protects
against "tyranny and abuse").
275. In cases where the Court has mentioned the principle that federalism protects
individuals, it has applied the plain statement rule to the challenged statute to avoid constitutional doubt.
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464-67 (invoking the plain statement rule to resolve ambiguity and find that
state judges are "appointee[s] on the policymaking level" and therefore not protected by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). The Court likewise used the plain statement rule when it
considered the merits of Bond See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089-90 (2014) (citing and
quoting Gregory in finding that the federal statute making it a criminal offense to possess or use
chemical weapons did not reach "purely local crimes").
276. New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
277. Id. at 181-82.
278. Id. at 182.
279. The only act by a state official asserted to constitute consent to the federal statute
was a deputy commissioner's congressional testimony in support of the statute. Id. at 181. It seems
unlikely that this act bound the state government.
280. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) ("The Court
can only conclude that Justice O'Connor meant . . . that a state cannot consent to be compelled . . . .
[One cannot consent to have a gun held to one's head. The idea of 'consent' in such a scenario is
meaningless.").
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281
this Article, or perhaps by a more fundamental notion that the tax revolt
movement reflects an impulse to get "something for nothing." 282 Without
further development of the principle that federalism protects individuals, we are
left to speculate about its implications for preemption of state tax limits.
IV. Possible State Circumvention of Tax Limit Preemption
If Congress were to preempt state tax limits in municipal bankruptcy, the
states also would retain control over the conditions under which municipalities
enter bankruptcy. Municipal bankruptcy is permitted only if the state authorizes
283the filing. That retention of control opens up the possibility that states could
circumvent federal preemption of tax limits. There is at least some suggestion
in case law that state governments can use their control over whether a
municipality files a bankruptcy petition to dictate to the municipality how it
must conduct the ensuing bankruptcy.284 Thus, it is arguably permissible for a
state to require that a municipality abide by state-law limits on tax increases as
a condition of filing, just as it is arguably permissible for a state to require that
a municipality abide by state-law limits on pension cuts as a condition of filing.
If states can simply amend the law authorizing municipal bankruptcy to
require that bankrupt municipalities abide by state tax limits, what good is the
preemption of state tax limits? Won't states simply make the necessary
amendments to their state laws and return to the status quo ante? There are
several answers.
First, although it is possible that states may control the conduct of
municipal bankruptcy through their authorization requirements, it is not clear
that they may do so. 285 Second, state tax limits often do not originate with state
legislatures, but instead with anti-tax activists who make use of the initiative
281. See discussion supra Section I.A.
282. See, e.g., DAVID 0. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR
NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA 70 (1982); see also id. at I ("People are understandably readier to demand
services from government than to pay for them.").
283. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) ("An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of
this title if and only if such entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor under such chapter by
State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity
to be a debtor under such chapter.").
284. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432
B.R. 262, 270 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff'g, 403 B.R. 72, 76-77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) ("If California had
desired to restrict the ability of its municipalities to reject public employee contracts in light of state
labor law, it could have done so as a pre-condition to seeking relief under Chapter 9."); In re City of
Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 17 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012) ("While a state may control prerequisites for
consenting to permit one of its municipalities . . . to file a chapter 9 case, it cannot revise chapter 9.");
see also Moringiello, supra note 23, at 458 (2014) ("By granting the states [a] gatekeeper role, Congress
... provided a mechanism for state participation in the federal bankruptcy process."). But see In re City
of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 153 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (listing ways Michigan could have protected
pensions from impairment in bankruptcy and not including conditions on authorization to file).
285. See, e.g., Detroit, 504 B.R. at 153 (not including conditions on authorization to
file in a list of ways Michigan could have protected pensions from impairment in bankruptcy).
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process.286 State legislative majorities may dislike the limits and be in no hurry
287to reenact them. Reimposing the limits might require new initiatives with all
the accompanying difficulties of such efforts. Third, even if some legislators do
want to reimpose the tax limits in municipal bankruptcy, there is the
substantive argument that bankruptcy is a special case. Even if one concedes
that tax limits are desirable in general, there is a special interest in rehabilitating
insolvent municipalities, whose travails may affect the credit standing of
"neighboring jurisdictions, the state, and even the nation." 288 State tax limits
can interfere with achieving the goal of rehabilitation.
Moreover, residents of municipalities that are not in distress may perceive
little threat that they will endure the tax increases made possible by the
proposal. The new local taxes will be paid, by and large, by the residents of the
insolvent municipality. Indeed, tax limit preemption in bankruptcy may be in
the financial interest of residents of non-distressed cities, because if distressed
cities cannot right themselves they may receive bailouts from the state
government.289 If the choice is between selectively lifting tax limits and bailing
out insolvent municipalities, citizens who are concerned with their own tax bills
and who do not expect their own municipality 290 to go bankrupt may favor the
preemption of state tax limits.
Finally, Congress may be able to insist on state abandonment of any effort
to circumvent preemption of tax limits as a condition of access to municipal
bankruptcy. Congress could condition access to municipal bankruptcy on state
acceptance of tax limit preemption. As discussed below, such a condition
should withstand constitutional scrutiny as long as it is within the federal
bankruptcy power and does impermissibly coerce the states.
Conclusion
This Article advances and defends a proposal for federal preemption of
state tax limits and electoral requirements, such as those imposed by
California's Proposition 13, in municipal bankruptcy. Such limits apparently
contribute to municipal financial distress and restrict municipalities' flexibility
286. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 33, at 100-08 (describing passage of California's
Proposition 13 by initiative); Mark Henkels, Measure 5 (Property Taxes), OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/measure-5_property_taxes (reporting that Oregon's Measure 5,
limiting local taxes, was a ballot initiative).
287. See MARTIN, supra note 33, at 104 (recounting California legislature's attempt to
defeat Proposition 13 by proposing alternative measure to voters).
288. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 302 (2012). Gillette also presents evidence for the
plausibility of such an outcome. See id. at 302-06.
289. See, e.g., id. at 308-09 (discussing state bailouts of distressed municipalities).
290. A "municipality" under the Bankruptcy Code can be a special district such as a
water or sewer district, and in fact most municipal bankruptcies over the life of the statute have been of
such special districts. See Moringiello, supra note 23, at 406. The point in the text holds nevertheless.
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in responding to distress.291 The proposal would amend Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code to provide that a plan may be confirmed if it provides for tax
levels or increases in excess of limits provided by state law and if it provides
for tax increases notwithstanding any requirement of state law that such
increases are subject to electoral approval.292
The Article argues that such preemption is a permissible exercise of
Congress's power under the Bankruptcy Clause. The Supreme Court has
recognized that the Clause confers broad power on Congress to legislate "on
the subject of any person's general inability to pay [its] debts," 293 and the
Court's conception of this power has expanded over time to meet new
conditions. 294 In only one case has the Court found that Congress exceeded its
authority under the Bankruptcy Clause, but only because the statute concerned
was not "uniform" because it affected only one named railroad.295 The proposal
to preempt state tax limits presents no such issue: it affects all states with tax
limits. Moreover, preemption of state tax limits advances both the creditor-
recovery and debtor-rehabilitation goals of bankruptcy law.296
Specific limits on the bankruptcy power that scholars or courts have
embraced do not preclude adoption of the proposal advanced in this Article.
For example, it has been argued that the bankruptcy power extends only to
adjustment of the affairs of an insolvent debtor.297 This limit does not affect the
proposal because only insolvent municipal debtors may seek bankruptcy relief.
Alternatively, some decisions that speak to the bankruptcy power
generally may appear to restrict it to proceedings that liquidate property.
However, the Supreme Court has recognized in its municipal bankruptcy
decisions and in earlier decisions relating to compositions and railroad
reorganizations that bankruptcy proceedings need not liquidate property.298
It has been asserted in scholarly literature that bankruptcy may not impair
the rights of noncreditors.299 Even assuming that state tax limits confer "rights"
on taxpayers within the meaning of this assertion, this proposition faces several
issues. In Wright v. Central Union Fire Insurance Co., the Supreme Court
upheld a bankruptcy statute that impaired a noncreditor's rights. 300 Moreover,
existing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code call for the impairment of these
rights. Finally, the principal academic defense of the no-impairment-of-
291. See discussion supra Section I.A.
292. See discussion supra Section I.B.
293. See Cont'l Ill. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island, & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S.
648, 670 (1935) (quoting Kunzler v. Kohaus, 5 Hill 317, 321 (N.Y. 1843)).
294. See supra Section II.A.2.
295. See supra Section II.A.2.
296. See supra Section II.A. I.
297. See supra Section II.B.1.
298. See supra Section III.B. 1.
299. See discussion Section Ill.B.2.
300. 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
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noncreditors proposition relies on an originalist reading of the Constitution that
the Supreme Court has rejected in the municipal bankruptcy context.
The Article defends the proposal for state tax limit preemption against the
objection that such preemption would violate the Tenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court has recognized, ever since it first approved municipal
bankruptcy in United States v. Bekins, that valid state consent to municipal
bankruptcy cures the Tenth Amendment issue.301 As Bekins suggests, later
decisions confirm, and the recent Detroit and Stockton decisions reaffirm, states
may give valid consent to a municipal bankruptcy statute that authorizes
municipal bankruptcy plans that would otherwise violate state constitutional
provisions, such as clauses forbidding the impairment of contracts.302
Municipal bankruptcy plans that would violate tax limits found in state
constitutions should stand on the same footing.
Under modem Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, courts would scrutinize
whether a state's consent to municipal bankruptcy is valid, as opposed to being
impermissibly coerced.303 State tax limit preemption grants states and their
instrumentalities freedom of action rather than taking it away, because
municipalities are able to take measures to right their finances that would
otherwise be impermissible. Even if state tax limit preemption is seen as
restricting state power, it should pass muster under NFIB, the Supreme Court's
most recent decision in the area. Unlike Medicaid, the program at issue in
NFIB, municipal bankruptcy is not too attractive for states to turn down.
Moreover, it was critical to the Court's analysis in NFIB that the Affordable
Care Act provisions at issue were separate and independent from the existing
Medicaid program. State tax preemption in municipal bankruptcy cannot be
described as separate and independent from municipal bankruptcy.
Congress can authorize the municipalities of consenting states to propose
bankruptcy plans that would otherwise violate state constitutional constraints.
To date, this power to preempt has been used against creditors. Most recently
and dramatically, retirees felt its force in the Detroit and Stockton bankruptcies.
This use of Congress's power is unduly one-sided. Municipal financial distress
arises not just from the presence of liabilities, but also from the absence of
assets. Municipal insolvency can be addressed by increasing available revenues
as well as by adjusting debts. Preemption of state tax limits in bankruptcy can
help municipalities raise funds and thereby cope with financial distress.
Congress's use of its preemptive power to help cities raise revenues would
bring greater balance and fairness to municipal bankruptcy.
301. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
302. See discussion supra Section III.B.
303. See discussion supra Section III.C.
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